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GOVERNANCE METHODS USED IN EXTERNALIZING INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY  
STEVEN KING-LUN CHAN 
ABSTRACT 
 
Information technology (IT) is the largest capital expenditure in many firms and is 
an integral part of many organizations’ strategies. However, the benefits that each 
company receives from its IT investments vary. One study by Weill (2004) found that the 
top performer in the sample was estimated to have as high as a 40% greater return on its 
IT investment than its competitors. To expedite the progress toward getting better value 
from IT investments, along with the need to deal with the increasing complexity and 
expense of IT, a growing number of companies are turning to outside service providers to 
develop and/or manage various aspects of their information systems. The governance 
methods used by firms to maintain control over the quality, services, and cost of IT 
outsourcing are the focus of this dissertation. 
Previously in the literature, researchers have looked into the phenomenon of 
outsourcing from various perspectives. However, existing literature has not constructed 
or proposed an outsourcing model that examines the important moderating impact of 
internal technical capabilities to governance mechanisms. Building on existing literature 
related to IT outsourcing, this dissertation examines governance mechanisms that were 
used by firms to maintain control over the quality, services, and the cost of outsourcing of 
IT in order to identify their contribution to the success of IT outsourcing initiatives from 
the perspective of managers whose companies have engaged in IT outsourcing. In this 
dissertation, a research model was developed, and through an on-line survey instrument, 
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data were collected from the members of the Information Systems Community of 
Practice in the Project Management Institute. The findings showed that the following 
governance mechanisms had positive impact on managerial perceptions of IT outsourcing 
success: (1) Financial commitment in the form of dedicated asset-specific investments; 
and (2) attitudinal commitment. This study also confirms the moderation effect that firm 
technological capabilities have on the relationship between managerial perception of 
outsourcing success and attitudinal commitment, respectively. Additionally, this study 
added to the literature in that it found that financial commitment and attitudinal 
commitment impacts on future business are partially mediated by outsourcing success.  
Based on the findings of this study, practical application and suggestion for future 
research are offered. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This dissertation focuses on strategic drivers related to managerial perceptions of 
outsourcing success. It specifically assesses how formal and informal contracts—from 
the underpinning theory of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)—interact with internal 
and external technological capabilities—from the underpinning theory of the Resource-
Based View (RBV)—and work together to impact managerial perceptions of outsourcing 
success. It builds linkages by using the Relational View of interorganizational 
cooperative strategies (Dyer & Singh, 1998) to bridge both the TCE and the RBV. Each 
of these theories will be discussed extensively in Chapter 2, Literature Review.   
The Information Technology (IT) industry was selected to demonstrate the 
importance of these relationships because it readily provides rich, well-developed 
theoretical and empirical support the outsourcing construct, and it also provides a 
sophisticated arena in which to test the model developed for this dissertation. While TCE, 
the RBV, and the Relational View are the main drivers of this dissertation, it is necessary 
to first understand the main outsourcing issues central of the IT industry.  Therefore, this 
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dissertation begins with a discussion of outsourcing as it has been established in the IT 
literature and then it moves to the potential impacts of its main theoretical drivers and 
how they inform the research questions that this dissertation works to answer.      
Information Technology (IT) was little known until the 1980s when personal 
computers became more common in the workplace (Allen, 1999), after IBM introduced 
its first personal computer in 1981 (Butler, 1998). Since then, corporations around the 
world have now embraced IT as a vital and inseparable part of daily business operations 
(Renkema, 1998; Sambamurthy, Bharadwa, & Grover, 2003). Mosner (2003) cited a 
2001 survey done by the Department of Commerce and the National 
Telecommunications Information Agency that found more than 57 percent of the U.S. 
workforce was already using personal computers in their jobs. The U.S Census Bureau 
also reported that 56 percent of U.S. working adults used a computer at work in 2003 
(Day, 2005).  By 2009, 76.7% of U.S. households had a computer (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2011).   
This impressive use of IT has led organizations to find ways to manage their IT 
resources more cost-effectively and this had led to significant IT outsourcing, which has 
led to costly problems in IT governance of IT contracts IT.  Despite the number of studies 
being published in the IT literature, little research has been done that actually measures 
the impacts of formal and informal contract mechanisms (TCE) and use of 
interorganizational resources (RBV and the Relational View) that might result in a better 
IT services contract. The following subsections are devoted to IT as it is used herein and 
its importance to businesses today.   
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1.1 Information Technology and Business Value Today 
Information technology (IT) was defined by the Architectural and Transportation 
Barriers Compliance Board (Access Board) of the United States Government as:   
“any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of equipment, 
that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, 
movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or 
reception of data or information. The term “information technology” includes 
computers, ancillary equipment, software, firmware and similar procedures, 
services (including support services), and related resources” (Access Board, 
2000, para. 7). 
 
Nevo and Wade (2010) stated that IT has become an integral part of business 
organization. Straub, Weill, and Schwaig (2007) also mentioned that IT was becoming 
critical in an organization's success. This echoes Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1996), who 
concluded that IT had increased productivity and created substantial value for consumers 
even though they did not find evidence to indicate that these benefits resulted in higher 
business profitability. They theorized that the lack of evidence in companies getting 
higher profits from IT investments was because IT also lowered entry barriers for other 
competitors, which caused more products to be available in the market. Therefore, the 
prices that companies could charge for those products were reduced subsequently and this 
impacted overall business profitability. Both productivity and profitability are constructs 
commonly used by scholars when evaluating the business value of IT (Melville, Kraemer, 
& Gurbaxani, 2004). 
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Melville et al. (2004) defined IT business value as the “organizational 
performance impacts of information technology at both the intermediate process level 
and the organization-wide level, comprising both efficiency and competitive impacts” (p. 
287). Based on their study of existing literature, Melville et al. (2004) summarized the 
measurements of IT business value to include “productivity enhancement, profitability 
improvement, cost reduction, competitive advantage, inventory reduction, and other 
measures of performance” (p. 287). While researchers have not been able to attribute 
definitively the impact of their IT investments on business performance (Kohli & Grover, 
2008), many have found significant values of IT in business, and thus have classified it as 
a strategic necessity (Nevo & Wade, 2010). For example, after analyzing data collected 
for 36 monthly periods from eight hospitals, Devaraj and Kohli (2003) were able to 
establish a direct linkage between technology usage and net revenue per patient. Melville 
et al. (2004) also concluded that IT benefited business through increased flexibility and 
quality improvement, but the extent of its impact was dependent upon other internal and 
external factors.  
With the rapid advancement of technology, many companies successfully have 
integrated IT into their business models as a powerful way to foster growth, improve 
interconnectivity among various business units, and to enhance their competitive 
advantage in the marketplace (Nevo & Wade, 2010). However, the benefits that each 
company receives from its IT investments do vary. One study by Weill (2004) found that 
the top performer in the sample was estimated to have as high as a 40% greater return on 
its IT investment than its competitors.  Thus, from the literature, it is assumed that IT 
investments in outsourcing provide inconsistent results, and therefore, it is necessary to 
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better understand how those IT investments are governed, particularly in the outsourcing 
arrangement.   
1.2 Strategic Governance of IT Outsourcing 
To realize better value from IT investments, many companies have turned to 
outside sources for assistance and guidance, and thus a surge in IT outsourcing has 
occurred (Wonseok, Gallivan, & Kim, 2006). This focus on externalizing IT services 
through an outsourcing contract aligns with TCE and its market versus hierarchy 
approach.  From the TCE theoretical point of view, a corporation can be seen as a bundle 
of transactions (Coase, 1937) that propels the company forward. Ever since it was 
introduced by Coase (1937), TCE theory has been applied widely by scholars to explain 
how organizations make strategic purchasing decisions. It explains that markets and 
hierarchies are two alternative governance mechanisms (Coase, 1937), with the strict 
definition of markets being those goods or services that are purchased externally to the 
firm, and hierarchies being those goods or services that are developed inside the firm.  
Choosing one or the other largely depends on the transaction costs that are involved in 
these two options.  Thus, outsourcing as used in this dissertation falls within the market-
type of transaction from TCE. 
As described by Simmonds and Gilmour (2005) and consistent with the TCE 
market perspective (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975), outsourcing is a practice that allows 
organizations to transfer their service delivery to external vendors. Although the number 
of outsourcing projects is increasing year after year and their potential benefits in many 
areas (e.g. cost savings, higher return on investment, and allowing companies to focus on 
their core competencies) are growing steadily (Martorelli, 2010), the promise of these 
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outsourcing providers to deliver added value remains somewhat unfulfilled (Willcocks, 
Hindle, Feeny, & Lacity, 2004). Particularly, as Willcocks et al. (2004) noted, client 
organizations frequently were not able to exploit vendors’ superior technical know-how, 
mature management practice, and economies of scale.  
The widespread adoption of IT outsourcing has emerged as an active research 
area for scholars since 1990 (Dibbern, Goles, Hirschheim & Jayatilaka, 2004). Among 
existing literature, scholars define IT outsourcing very similarly. However, these 
definitions vary because the propositions made by these authors are based on the purpose 
of their research. According to Klepper (1995), IT outsourcing has been described as “the 
provision of services by a vendor firm to a client” (p. 249). Loh and Venkatraman (1992) 
defined IT outsourcing more specifically as “managing a firm’s IT infrastructure through 
governance mechanisms with other firms” (p. 8). Two years later, Takac (1994) included 
the ownership dimension in the definition of IT outsourcing by stating that it involved 
transferring IT-related assets from service buyers to service providers so that service 
providers could take over the responsibility for the outsourced IT activity. Altinkemer, 
Chaturvedi, and Gulati (1994), who used the term information systems (IS) to reference 
IT, defined IT outsourcing as the “act of subcontracting a part, or all, of an organization’s 
IS work to external vendor(s), or manage on its behalf” (p. 252). For the purposes of this 
research, I am adopting the definition from Altinkemer et al. (1994) because it includes 
both IT-related services delivery and IT infrastructure management, which reflects 
current business practices (Cha, Pingry, & Thatcher, 2009).  
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1.2.1 Decisions Driving IT Outsourcing 
 
IT outsourcing entails cultivation of an interorganizational relationship between 
the client and the service provider, and thus, an inherently relational approach to the 
provision of IT services (Lee, Miranda, & Kim, 2004). This interorganizational approach 
is consistent with what Dyer and Singh (1989) term a Relational View.  The Relational 
View is aligned with the RBV, which is concerned with internal resources and 
capabilities (Barney, 1991); however, it is distinct from the RBV in that it considers 
resources to also be derived from an interorganizational dyad or network, which results in 
a greater rent-earning potential for the resources (Dyer & Singh, 1989).   
Several empirical studies have stated that outsourcing IT services to external 
vendors will help companies achieve higher service performance with lower cost (e.g. 
Duganier, 2005), and will allow corporations to gain competitive advantage (Johnston, 
Abader, Brey, & Stander, 2009; Lacity & Hirschheim, 1995). Competitive advantage 
occurs when a company acquires or develops a similar service or product as its 
competition, but at a lower cost (cost advantage), or by delivering a superior service or 
product than its competition (differentiation advantage) (Porter, 1985). These benefits 
motivate top business executives to increasingly contract out their IT operations to 
external service providers. 
Recent literature on motivations for IT outsourcing suggests that outsourcing 
decisions are propelled by several other reasons. Both McFarlan and Nolan (1995) and 
Duganier (2005) stated that being able to obtain higher level of IT services at a lower cost 
was the key decisive factor for companies to outsource their IT operations. While 
acknowledging cost control was a key factor of IT outsourcing, Johnston et al. (2009) 
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added that environmental uncertainty, the high cost of developing internal expertise, and 
the ability to focus on companies’ core business functions are also important factors that 
drive corporations’ outsourcing decisions. Kishor, Agrawal, and Rao (2004) indicated 
commercial exploitation was another driver, especially for e-commerce projects.  
IT outsourcing also has even been seen as a way to overcome internal politics to 
achieve organizational outcomes (Lacity & Hirschheim, 1995). Gartner (2005) has 
pointed out another noticeable factor for companies pursuing outsourcing—once 
personnel are freed from dealing with transaction-driven processes and tactical tasks, they 
can then spend more time on work that delivers strategic value. In addition, the growing 
technical complexity of IT and the substantial cost required to maintain a team of full-
time competent staff is prompting an increasing number of companies to rely on the 
specialized expertise of outside service providers (Willcocks & Fenn, 2006). The level of 
dependency is expected to increase as firms become more reliant on the knowledge and 
motivation of external suppliers.  
Depending on the nature of the outsourcing deals, the level of services offered by 
outside IT providers can range from body shopping (Pattnaik, 2005) and short-term 
consulting (Meyskens, Von Glinow, Werther, & Clarke, 2009) to selective outsourcing 
and comprehensive outsourcing (Lacity et al., 1996). Appendix A provides a detailed 
description of each of these outsourcing types.  In this study, these outsourcing types are 
assumed to be held constant because the study concentrates on the managerial 
perceptions of outsourcing success given an outsourcing contract’s governance type 
(driven by TCE), a firm’s internal technological capabilities (driven by the RBV), and the 
desire to extrapolate more synergistic rents from interorganizational competitive 
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advantage (from the Relational View).  The TCE, the RBV, and the Relational View will 
be discussed further in Chapter 2, Literature Review.  Because the outsourcing type of 
contract was held constant, future work could include interactions between outsourcing 
type and the model developed herein.   
1.2.2 IT Outsourcing Benefits 
 
Based on their observations of organizations that outsource their IT functions, 
Lacity and Willcocks (2000) categorized the desired benefits in terms of six strategic 
foci, namely financial position improvement, core competence, technology catalyst, 
business transition, business innovation, and new market. These anticipated benefits may 
appear individually or in combination over the outsourcing life cycle:  
1. Financial position improvement through enhancing a firm’s financial 
position by reducing overall the costs of performing a business function. 
2. Core competence building through redirecting internal staff to focus on 
tasks that are more strategic in nature to provide better value.   
3. Technology catalyst through bringing in external expertise to expedite the 
company’s adoption of new technology.   
4. Business transition through employing vendors to assist with key changes.  
5. Business innovation through working toward business transformation and 
improving skills and technology to achieve competitive advantage. 
6. New market development through using new sales channels to extend a 
company’s product or services to a broader audience.  
These perceived advantages could be seen as the key reasons that lead to large IT 
outsourcing deals being announced so frequently (Cha et al., 2009).  
During the first half of 2010, Forrester Research interviewed 54 companies that 
have ongoing outsourcing projects worth at least $10 million each. With the average 
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score being 4.33 out of 5, executives in these companies gave high marks for all 10 
service delivery categories that Forrester tracked (Martorelli, 2010). 
Even though the above-mentioned study shows that outsourcing projects are 
performing better than before (Martorelli, 2010), success is not guaranteed. However, 
Lacity and Willcocks (2000) found strong evidence that significant benefits can be gained 
through IT outsourcing, and these benefits are not limited to financial improvements. Per 
Claire et al. (2010) (processing efficiencies, quality improvements, plant scale flexibility 
and quality) and Kakumanu and Portanova (2006) (core competency development), the 
benefits derived from outsourcing help to align functional tactics with business strategy. 
In doing this, companies can increase the probability of higher performance (Hayes & 
Wheelwright, 1984). The Cao and Hoffman (2011) study also found that business 
strategy and functional-tactic alignment had a positive effect on business performance.   
1.2.3 IT Outsourcing Detriments 
 
Despite some of the strong benefits of IT outsourcing, it also has significant 
detriments. A 1995 paper published by the Standish Group found that the cancellation 
rate for outsourcing projects was as high as 31.1%. The data suggested that over half of 
the outsourcing projects would end up costing almost double what they were originally 
estimated. Furthermore, there seemed to be a correlation between the failure rate and the 
size of the buying companies (Standish Group, 1995). While, on average, 16.2% of the 
software projects were completed on-time and on-budget, only 9% of the companies with 
revenue greater than $500 million achieve that kind of success. Dun and Bradstreet 
(2001) also reported that between 20–25% of large IT outsourcing projects failed within 
two years, and an alarming 50% of these projects failed within five years.  
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DiamondCluster International, a consulting firm that specialized in Internet-based 
business development and telecommunications strategies, surveyed senior executives 
from both service recipients and service providers annually between 2002 and 2006 
(Thibodeau, 2006). Its 2005 study revealed that growing numbers of companies were 
dissatisfied with their outsourcing vendors and struggled to realize full benefits from their 
outsourced projects (Weakland, 2005). While only 21% of the survey participants in 2004 
reported that they had abnormally terminated an outsourcing vendor or canceled an 
outsourcing contract in the past twelve months, the number more than doubled to 51% in 
2005 (Weakland, 2005) and 47% in 2006 (Thibodeau, 2006). These findings indicate that 
there is room for improvement. 
 Although Martorelli (2010) found many benefits as discussed in the previous 
section, the study also found that not all aspects of service delivery surveyed were getting 
high praise. While vendors’ abilities to make a transformational impact in customers’ 
environments had the lowest score among the 10 categories, executives ranked the 
vendor’s account management and governance skills just in the middle of these ten 
categories. This certainly signals room for improvement in the IT governance area. (Note, 
because governance can take many forms, the next section will review IT governance).   
Top executives also listed expectation management with business buyers  
(customers), effective knowledge transfer, and better goal alignment between outsourcers 
and business buyers as some of the top challenges that they experience with outsourcing 
partners (Martorelli, 2010). This latest finding echoes previous studies, which found that 
buyers were not able to absorb and exploit knowledge from their service providers 
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(Willcocks et al., 2004) and they struggled to realize the full benefit from their 
outsourced projects (Weakland, 2005).   
Although vendors are responsible for delivering business value to their customers, 
Moore (2004) suggests purchasing companies need to share some of the burden before 
they can enjoy full benefits from their outsourcing initiatives. Mismanagement, not being 
able to solidify requirements, and bad-vendor and technology-selection procedures, 
among others, are some of the key factors that contribute to negative outcomes for 
outsourcing projects. Buyers have direct control over these elements (Moore, 2004).  
Clearly, research on the results of IT outsourcing is mixed. This dissertation 
intends to clarify parts of this issue by not only looking at benefits from cost, governance 
type, financial commitment (asset specificity), commitment (attitudinal), and trust 
(calculative), it also looks at the impact of technological capability on managerial 
perceptions of outsourcing success and the possibility of future business.  
1.3 The Purpose of this Dissertation 
Previous researchers have studied the phenomenon of outsourcing from many 
different perspectives, including the following: 
1.  Impact on the firm from an economic perspective and from political or social 
perspectives (Lacity & Hirschheim, 1993);  
2. A resource and skills perspective--among all essential business functions, IT is 
considered as one of the areas requiring highly skilled employees and thus demands 
significant amounts of resources (Loughry & Elms, 2006; Masters & Miles, 2002; 
Teece, 1986);  
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3. Key determinants of outsourcing (e.g., Loh and Venkatraman (1992) studied the 
effect of strategic intent, project complexity, and technological maturity phase in 
organizations’ e-commerce project sourcing decisions); and  
4. Technical skills required as antecedents to outsourcing (Auber, Rivard, & Patry, 
2004). 
This dissertation enriches previous research in the subject of outsourcing by 
investigating factors that can affect manager’s perception in IT outsourcing success. It 
focuses on governance-mechanism contributions to successful IT outsourcing initiatives 
from the perspective of managers who have overseen IT outsourcing engagements. 
Robbins (2009) stated that perception “is a process by which individuals organise and 
interpret their sensory impressions in order to give meaning to their environment” 
(p.119).  Robbins (2009) further indicated that “peoples’ behaviour is based on their 
perception of what reality is, not on reality itself. The world as it is perceived is the world 
that is behaviourally important” (p. 119). DeArmond, Huang, Chen, and Courtney (2010) 
also mentioned that “individuals' attitudes or perceptions can influence their actions” 
(p.4). This notion was confirmed by studies such as that by Ang and Straub (1998), which 
concluded that perceived comparative advantages in production costs offered by vendors 
had influenced executives’ decisions to outsource their IT functions. In the context of this 
study, one can infer that a manager’s perception of an outsourcing outcome is an 
important measure because this perception can impact a manager’s decision in future IT 
outsourcing endeavors. The main focus of this dissertation will be the examination, 
investigation, and analysis of governance mechanisms and their impact on success of IT 
outsourcing, or more specifically, the formal and informal mechanisms that are 
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theoretically driven, the internal resources required to support and enhance those 
contractual governance mechanisms, and the interorganizational resources necessary to 
achieve higher perceptions of satisfaction regarding the outsourcing arrangement.  
By building on the existing knowledge base, this study contributes to the field of 
strategic management by highlighting and examining the contributions of the need for 
governance of critical resources, and the actual difficulties in managing a contract based 
on knowledge wherein the skills of the individuals involved in any contract become a 
critical resource for the outsourcing firm (per Dyer & Singh, 1989). In reviewing the 
extant literature, this dissertation asks and studies the following questions: 
1.  Given TCE, what is the impact of formal and informal mechanisms on 
managerial perceptions of outsourcing success? 
2. Given the RBV, what is the impact of internal technological capabilities on 
managerial perceptions of outsourcing success?   
3. How does the Relational View of interorganizational competitive advantage 
help to bridge TCE and the RBV, and better inform managerial perceptions of 
outsourcing success?    
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CHAPTER II 
Literature Review 
 
 
There are competing as well as complementary theories regarding IT outsourcing 
governance; among which, the TCE, and the RBV traditionally have been applied to an 
organizational economics approach in the discipline of strategic management. To many 
scholars, these theories are considered as part of the theoretical core of the management 
discipline (Barney & Ouchi, 1986; Rumelt, Schendel & Teece, 1994). They have been 
used in a number of articles on growing outsourcing practices in IT from various 
perspectives, such as the determinants of sourcing decisions (Ang & Straub, 1998; 
Kishore, Agrawal & Rao, 2004; Loh & Venkatraman, 1992), the importance of 
maintaining internal capability (Willcocks & Feeny, 2006), and the relationship between 
IT outsourcing strategy and outsourcing success (Lee, Miranda, & Kim, 2004). In the 
following sections, these prominent theories are reviewed and their relevancy to this 
empirical study is discussed.   
Besides TCE and RBV, Agency Theory also has been used in some IT 
outsourcing literature. Agency Theory traditionally is used to explain the principal-agent 
issues that initially focused on the relationship between owners and managers (Berle & 
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Means, 1932). Since the ground-breaking work done by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Agency Theory has been used by scholars to explain phenomenon found in executive 
compensation, employee management, and corporate governance, among others. It is 
concerned with the agency relationship, which occurs every time an entity (the agent) 
performs work on behalf of, or takes on responsibility from, another entity (the principal) 
who owns the assets, in accordance with a mutually agreed contract (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). While principals want their agents to work as hard as possible 
for the compensation that they are paying their agents, Agency Theory argues that 
employees are motivated to exert as little effort as possible for the rewards. Conflicts of 
interest also have been shown to occur between managers and owners, in which owners 
want to optimize their profits, but managers are more concerned about doing things that 
will secure or even improve their jobs and status, such as acquisition or using corporate 
assets for personal use (Galbraith, 1967; Williamson, 1964).  
The separation of ownership and control and the conflict of interests between the 
principal and agent are the underpinning focus of Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). However, neither of this occurs in typical IT outsourcing engagements. In a 
typical IT outsourcing project, such as business process outsourcing (BPO) and custom 
application development, the outsourcing companies (the principals) do not actually own 
the tangible and intangible resources that their vendors (the agents) use to provide their 
services. Because this study is concerned with IT outsourcing from the outsourcing 
companies’ point of view, it will not make use of the Agency Theory and will focus on 
demonstrating how the competing theories of TCE and the RBV explain the tension 
between trying to manage the tremendous costs of IT and outsourcing contracts (using 
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efficiency arguments from the TCE) and deriving value-added activities from an 
outsourcing contract (using effectiveness arguments from the RBV).   
Finally, the Relational View of interorganizational competitiveness (Dyer & 
Singh, 1989) bridges the TCE and RBV, and notes that development of external networks 
are a source of competitive advantage to those firms that learn to use those networks 
successfully (Dyer, 1996).  The typical short-term market interaction between and 
outsourcer and outsourcee is being replaced by longer term vertical partnerships in which 
both outsourcer and outsourcee collaborate greatly (Johnston & Lawrence, 1988), and 
outsourcing relationships have become critical to organizational strategy (Dubini, 1997). 
Given that critical functions have now been outsourced, Dyer and Singh (1998) identified 
four potential sources of interorganizational competitive advantage as critical to 
preserving relational rents, as follows: 
1.  Relations-specific assets;  
2. Knowledge-sharing routines;  
3. Complementary resources; and  
4. Effective governance. 
These Relational View’s sources of competitive advantage clearly bridge TCE 
and RBV, with relation-specific assets being similar to TCE’s asset-specificity, 
knowledge-sharing routines being similar to the RBV’s knowledge sharing; and effective 
governance being similar to TCE’s contributions to governance structure. The main 
difference between the market perspective of TCE, the firm-level RBV, and the 
Relational View is that both TCE and the RBV have the firm as the unit of analysis at 
their core. The Relational View, has the interorganizational dyad or network as the unit of 
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analysis at its core, and it specifically includes complementary resources between firms 
in its paradigm.    
2.1 Transaction Cost Economics 
 
As noted in the introduction, The TCE views the corporation as a bundle of 
transactions (Coase, 1937), and has been applied widely by scholars to explain how 
organizations make strategic purchasing decisions. It explains that markets (strictly 
speaking , external purchases) and hierarchies (strictly speaking, internal development) 
are two alternative governance mechanisms (Coase, 1937). Choosing one or the other 
largely depends on the transaction costs that are involved in these two options. 
This idea gained further popularity after Williamson (1975, 1985) tested the 
efficiency of these governance structures with measurable transaction dimensions, such 
as asset specificity and transaction frequency. According to TCE, economizing is a basic 
fundamental goal of any organization (Williamson, 1991). Additionally, all economic 
activity revolves around different transactions that basically are some form of exchange 
of goods or services between two or more economic partners. To optimize this type of 
exchange, appropriate governance mechanisms must be matched to the nature of the 
transaction (Williamson, 1985). Any company that fails to comprehend the cost 
implications of their strategies may suffer inferior economic performance (Goerzen & 
Beamish, 2005).   
Williamson (1975) suggested that there are three key factors that determine 
whether a company will keep transactions within its hierarchy or move them into 
markets. Transactions, such as payroll processing, that are straightforward, repetitive 
and do not require transaction-specific investments, will take place across a market 
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interface. In this context, transaction-specific investments include money, time, or 
energy that cannot be transferred easily. However, transactions that are high in 
complexity, with high recurring frequency, or with “transaction-specific investments” 
(also known as asset-specificities, which can lead to opportunism in the transaction 
interface), are more likely to take place within hierarchically organized firms. This is 
because the costs to construct, monitor, and enforce transactions (i.e., transaction costs) 
in the latter scenarios often outweigh the market benefits if they are not being managed 
well (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006).   
According to TCE, bounded rationality and opportunism are two main causes of 
contractual hazards. Bounded rationality as first introduced by Simon (1955), in part, 
refers to the information asymmetry between actors and unknowns that often exists in 
business transactions. Although a complex construct in and of itself, bounded rationality 
is being used in this strict definition for this paper, particularly because of the information 
asymmetry that can occur between contract participants. Because bounded rationality 
cannot be eliminated, it is being treated as a constraining theoretical assumption within 
the TCE perspective per Judge and Dooley (2006). This study will follow the same 
assumption and treat bounded rationality as an inherent limitation. Furthermore, bounded 
rationality implies that managers making the significant decisions surrounding IT 
investments on outsourcing commitments do so without full knowledge of outcomes. 
This would help to explain how managers might be satisfied with cost outcomes, but be 
unsatisfied with effectiveness outcomes. This duality is important for this dissertation.   
Opportunism refers to human nature in that actors may seek to serve their self-
interests rather than the best interests of their partners, when given the opportunity. 
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According to Williamson (1975), opportunism “refers to a lack of candor or honesty in 
transactions, to include self-interest seeking with guile.” (p. 9). Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to know beforehand who will act opportunistically during the transaction and 
who will not, which creates behavioral uncertainty (Williamson, 1985).  
Contractual hazard (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975), which includes issues such 
as observability (Holmstrom, 1979), asset specificity (Williamson, 1985), and 
appropriability (Pisano, 1990), can lead to greater possibility of opportunism (Mayer 
& Salomon, 2006). Observability concerns the degree of monitoring that can be done 
to confirm actions by actors (Holmstrom, 1979). As stated by Holmstrom (1979), 
“full observation of actions is either impossible or prohibitively costly” (p. 74). The 
higher the degree of difficulty in monitoring actions and measuring quality of results, 
the higher the likelihood that a company will prefer using a hierarchical governance 
approach instead of a market-based contract (Mayer & Salomon, 2006). Asset 
specificity refers to the degree that assets can be deployed to alternative uses 
(Williamson, 1985). The higher the degree of asset specificity, the lower the amount 
of alternative uses of assets and the higher the possibility that vendors will act 
opportunistically (Kvaloy, 2007). This was often referred to as the holdup problem 
(Susarla, Subramanyam, & Karhadde, 2008). Lastly, appropriability describes the risk 
of exposing a company’s intellectual property to expropriation (Pisano, 1990). Using a 
company’s investment in research and development as an example, Pisano (1990) 
explained that corporations would conduct projects internally to minimize the risk of 
exposing their know-how to competitors.   
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Unlike bounded rationality, opportunism sometimes can be mitigated by 
appropriate governance mechanisms that match the nature of the transaction (Das & 
Teng, 2000). Misrepresentation of (Flinders, 2010), overcharging for (Pacheco, 2007), 
and withholding information (Bielski, 2006), or withholding technology (Cannice, Chen, 
& Daniels, 2003), are some opportunistic behaviors that one partner in a transaction may 
exhibit. In 2010, the British High Court ruled that Electronic Data Systems (EDS), now a 
unit of Hewlett-Packard (HP), misrepresented its capabilities when selling a Consumer 
Relationship Management (CRM) system service project to British Sky Broadcasting 
Group (BSkyB) (Flinders, 2010). It was reported that HP had agreed on June 7, 2010 to 
pay a total of £318 million, valued at that time at US$ 461 million (XE, 2010), as part of 
the final settlement of this legal case (Deans, 2010).  
By deploying appropriate governance mechanism(s), one can reduce the 
possibility of opportunism, but this also increases the cost of such a transaction (Kvaloy, 
2007). And with uncertainty, more elaborate governance mechanisms to reduce 
transaction costs effectively are needed because of the higher possibility of opportunism 
and potential damages resulting from such opportunism. Therefore, companies will have 
a competitive advantage if they can better manage the employment of such mechanisms 
to minimize transaction costs derived from environmental uncertainty, asset specificity, 
and the potential for opportunistic behavior, while effectively controlling such issues 
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Through synergies, companies will be able to keep the extra 
profits that their resources jointly generate (Becerra, 2008). This will in turn lead to 
superior profitability for the firms. Becerra (2008) called this resource specificity or 
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“marginal contribution of resources being specific to the firm in which they are 
employed” (p.1119).    
When encountering a make-or-buy decision, TCE assumes that market 
governance is preferable over hierarchical governance because of the free hand of the 
market derived from higher competition in the marketplace. As suggested by Adam 
Smith more than two centuries ago, society is somewhat self-regulated by the conjoined 
forces of self-interest and competition. Competitive market forces will induce the supply 
of goods and services that are desired by consumers at the costs that customers are 
willing to pay (Mafi-Kreft, 2003).  
Despite the higher costs of the initial search for the right partner and the 
administrative burden needed to coordinate tasks across corporate boundaries, TCE 
suggests that using market governance will make sense as long as the cost of a 
transaction within the institution remains higher than the total cost of the same 
transaction via open market exchange (Williamson, 1985; Saarinen & Vepsalainen, 
1994). As mentioned earlier in this study, one key cost while using an open market 
exchange is what TCE calls contractual hazard (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975), caused 
by issues such as imperfect measurement and asset specificity. From the TCE 
perspective, companies should internalize transactions in the presence of contractual 
hazards and employ external vendors to handle transactions when such hazards are 
absent (Mayer & Salomon, 2006). 
While TCE has suggested that the use of an appropriate governance structure 
helps to safeguard against opportunism, TCE has been criticized for lacking in social and 
relational aspects of the exchange (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006). Other scholars have 
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also weighed in on this important topic. For example, Anderson and Dekker (2005) 
suggested contract extensiveness, which is the extent both business partners engaging in 
IT outsourcing project can foresee contingencies when designing contracts. This was said 
to be one way to alleviate holdup by the other party (Susarla, Subramanyam, & 
Karhadde, 2008). Informal governance addresses this issue by focusing on building a 
long-lasting relationship between outsourcing companies and their service providers 
through relational contracting (Granovetter, 1985), trust (Ness & Haugland, 2003), and 
commitment (Goo, Kishore, Nam, Rao, & Song, 2007). Poppo and Zenger (2002) have 
argued that legal contracts and relational governance complement each other in inter-
organizational exchanges. This view point was also echoed by Ryall and Sampson (2009) 
and Goo, Kishore, Rao, & Nam (2008).  
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2001) described the first of these forms—relational  
contracts—as informal agreements that were sustained by the value of future business 
opportunities. These added business opportunities were said to “reduce incentives for 
opportunism in any given transaction” (Carson et al., 2006, p. 1058).  
The second form of informal mechanisms is trust, which is comprised of 
benevolent trust and calculative trust. Black (2008) defined benevolent trust as the extent 
to which one party believes that the other party has intentions and motives that will 
benefit both parties. Calculative trust is an ongoing, market-oriented economic evaluation 
where each party assesses the benefits and costs to be derived from creating and 
sustaining a relationship (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Ness and Haugland (2003) 
concluded that benevolent trust and calculative trust can affect the development and 
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expansion of inter-firm relationships. However, Jeffries and Reed (2000) theorized that 
too much trust can also lead to satisficing and pareto-inferior solutions.  
Lastly, the informal contract type of commitment indicated that one firm would 
identify with its business partner(s) and, therefore, be committed to maintaining the 
relationship to pursue the interests of both itself and its partner(s) (McGee & Ford, 1987). 
Commitment was found to moderate the impact of service-level agreements (SLAs) on 
outsourcing success (Goo, Huang, & Hart, 2008).  One year later, Goo, Kishore, Rao, and 
Nam (2009) empirically examined and confirmed that well-structured SLAs can also 
“enable effective management of outsourcing engagements through the development of 
partnership-style relationships with high levels of trust and commitment” (p. 120).  
2.1.1 Transaction Cost Economics and IT Outsourcing  
 
The evolving literature on IT outsourcing frequently has used TCE to help explain 
its observations and predictions. As Willcocks and Lacity (1995) stated, several 
academics such as Beath (1983), Klepper (1993), and Lacity and Hirschheim (1993) have 
proposed that TCE provides a solid theoretical framework for describing and explaining 
the IT outsourcing phenomenon. For example, by relying on TCE, Aubert, Rivard, and 
Patry (2004) indicated that uncertainty and measuring problems are the major deterrents 
to outsourcing, and the level of technical skills creates a positive relationship with the 
company’s decision to outsource its IT functions. At the same time, business skills do not 
seem to have a major impact on the IT outsourcing decision, which the authors believe is 
because of relatively low level of business skills are required to conduct IT operations. 
Lastly, this study finds that asset specificity renders inconsistent effects. While results 
from the study’s first round of surveys suggests a positive relationship between asset 
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specificity and outsourcing activities, which contradicts TCE, subsequent surveys using  
both non-experts and experts, indicates opposite effects more congruent with expected 
TCE results.   
Among all the recent studies, the most common discussion is related to the 
reasoning behind IT outsourcing, and many have focused on the economic determinants 
of such business relationships (Ang & Straub, 1998). One of the key reasons cited is no 
doubt the impression of cost savings that an open market can bring (Loh & Venkatraman, 
1992). From this, TCE helps to predict whether a company will decide if it wants to 
perform its IT functions in house or outsource them after comparing production costs of 
internal operations to the total cost of fees required to pay vendors for the same IT 
services in the marketplace, plus the transaction costs to manage such business exchanges 
(Saarinen & Vepsalainen, 1994). Here, transaction costs refer to the resources including 
human resources, tools, time, and financial outflow incurred in searching, creating, 
negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing a service contract between buyers and suppliers 
(Mahoney, 1992). Through their research on IT outsourcing contracts within the banking 
industry, Ang and Straub (1998) have confirmed that perceived comparative advantages 
in production costs offered by vendors do appear to influence executives to outsource 
their IT functions, and increasing transaction costs do have a deterring effect on the IT 
outsourcing decision. 
Lacity and Hirschheim (1995) found that firm size also affects a company’s IT 
outsourcing decisions. While IT service providers were perceived to be able to enjoy 
economies of scale, which were referred to as lower average costs per unit , “due to mass 
production efficiencies and labour specialization” (Lacity & Hirschheim, 1995, p. 339), 
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smaller organizations often have greater difficulty generating economies of scale in their 
own IT operations. They further reported that this advantage enabled service providers to 
offer their services at a lower cost than their customers’ internal IT departments, and they 
confirmed a negative relationship between firm size and outsourcing decisions. 
According to Mudambi and Tallman (2010), service providers achieve economies of 
scale by applying “these processes to multiple clients, thus gaining scale efficiencies not 
available to the potential outsourcing client. They also will experience learning effects in 
applying these processes in more situations and to a wider range of applications than any 
single client." (p. 1441).   
TCE has been used to help explain another key research area in IT outsourcing: 
the inter-firm cooperation or partnering relationship between the customer and the IT 
vendors (Clemons & Row, 1992; Klepper, 1995). Particular interest was paid to the 
variables that can improve the chance of a successful IT outsourcing relationship. For 
example, Levinthal and Fichman (1988) suggested that the inter-firm relationship grows 
over time, primarily through knowledge investments by the partner firms, and the trust 
and increased ability to communicate resulting from relationships between personnel of 
both parties. De Vita, Tekaya, and Wang (2010) also reported that service providers’ 
human and dedicated asset-specific investments contributed significantly to their 
relationship with customers. The Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) model of partnership 
development, which includes attraction, communication, bargaining power, and norms 
and expectations, also was being suggested as beneficial in managing the development of 
partnerships between customers and service vendors (Klepper, 1995). 
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Many scholars have introduced guidelines for practitioners to conduct outsourcing 
functions assessments (Lacity, Willcocks, & Deeny, 1996) and to manage outsourcing 
engagements (Willcocks & Lacity, 1995), which have made real contributions to our 
understanding of the IT outsourcing phenomenon. However, even though scholars were 
able to use TCE to provide an explanation for some of the IT outsourcing phenomenon, 
Willcocks and Lacity (1995) also asserted that they have found many residuals, which are 
the experiences not explained by the theory and anomalies that actually contradict the 
theory. In addition, though many scholars are treating TCE as a fully explanatory theory, 
not many empirical tests have been done to validate its predictive power. Therefore, 
Willcocks and Lacity (1995) have suggested scholars consider adding other established 
theories in their studies to help increase the accuracy of their explanatory power. This 
dissertation attempts to do so by combining TCE with the RBV and knowledge 
management, as seen in the following sections. 
2.2 The Resource-Based View 
The RBV traditionally has been used to understand the unique factors that enable 
organizations to gain and sustain competitive advantage (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; 
Barney, 1986, 1991; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984). It is considered one of the most 
widely accepted theories of strategic management (Newbert, 2007) because the RBV is at 
the core of strategic management theory and has been used as a theoretical basis in 
numerous studies (Berry-Stolzle & Altuntas, 2010). To find out the level of reliance upon 
the RBV’s support in empirical literature, Scott Newbert performed a search of published 
journal articles in ABI/Inform and EconLit and found that there were 1,152 articles with 
"resource-based" or "RBV" in their titles, or abstracts (Newbert, 2007). After applying 
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more filtering technique, such as looking for relevant keywords, and reading the abstracts 
and the contents of those articles, Newbert (2007) identified 55 articles that are 
substantively relevant to RBV. As these scholars indicate, not all resources under a 
company’s control are important to the success of that company. 
According to Barney (1991), firm resources include “all assets, capabilities, 
organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc., controlled by a 
firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its 
efficiency and effectiveness” (p. 101). Barney (1991) proposed how resource value, 
rareness, costly imitation, and strategic substitutes contributed to competitive advantage 
under conditions of uncertainty.  
Because of the management team’s intimate knowledge of the firm’s capabilities 
and its internal processes, managers are considered one of the key resources of any 
company as well. In fact, it was, Penrose (1959) whose work underpins the RBV and 
whom suggested a potentially important causal link between top managements’ 
knowledge of the firm’s resources and capabilities and superior resource allocation 
decisions.  
Barney (1991) extended Penrose’s work to explain the impact of resource 
heterogeneity on firm profits. Further extending the RBV, Teece et al. (1997) defined 
dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and 
external competences to address rapidly changing environments.” (p. 516). They used the 
word dynamic to emphasis the need to exploit “existing internal and external firm-
specific competences to address changing environments” (p. 510) because “certain 
innovative responses are required when time-to-market and timing are critical” (p. 515). 
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Winter (2003) elaborated on the concept of dynamic capabilities and introduced a term 
called ordinary or 'zero-level' capabilities, which referred to “those that permit a firm to 
'make a living' in the short term” (p. 991). Conversely, “capabilities that would change 
the product, the production process, the scale, or the customers (markets) served” (p. 992) 
are higher level capabilities.  
Helfat and Peteraf (2003) referred to organizational capability as the ability of an 
organization to perform a coordinated set of tasks and using organizational resources, for 
the purpose of achieving a particular end result. Additionally, organizational capabilities 
can be used to support production of a sequence of products or multiple products 
concurrently (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000), which make them more valuable to the 
companies that possess them. Kor and Mahoney (2005) also stated that intimate 
knowledge of the firm and its organizational capabilities could be critical for effective 
allocation of limited financial and human resources. The RBV suggests that managers’ 
firm-specific experience, involving tacit knowledge of a firm’s capabilities, 
organizational routines, and business objectives, allows managers to make better-
informed decisions that are unique to each firm (Penrose, 1959).  
This tacit knowledge is connected with problem solving (Polanyi, 1966), and 
dependent on the interactions within multiple parties (Goffin & Koners, 2011). 
Furthermore, tacit knowledge cannot be codified (Polanyi, 1962), which means that even 
the knowledge owner is not able to construct the relevant information into a set of 
identifiable rules and relationships that can be easily communicated (Kogut & Zander, 
1992). Therefore, it has been suggested that tacit knowledge can best be expressed by 
direct interaction and storytelling (Mascitelli, 2000). During outsourcing engagements, 
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employees who are actively engaged in this process potentially can gain valuable 
knowledge, including sourcing experience and efficient governance of the relationship 
with the vendors (Espino-Rodríguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2006).  
Through interactive learning, a company’s cross organizational boundary 
capabilities can be further enhanced (Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). The greater the 
development of such capabilities, the higher the probability of them influencing 
competitive advantage (Espino-Rodríguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2006). This type of 
valuable knowledge is a positive knowledge spillover, and the buyer must protect and 
promote its reuse and integration for its existing processes (Mayer, 2006) in order to have 
a continued competitive advantage. 
2.2.1 The Resource-Based View and IT Outsourcing 
Similar to TCE, the RBV has been applied considerably in IT outsourcing 
research. Many studies use the RBV to explain the determinants and extent of IT 
outsourcing. Willcocks and Feeny (2006) acknowledged several studies employed RBV 
to help explain contributions that IT can make to achieving competitive advantage. 
Espino-Rodriguez and Padron-Robaina (2006) stated that “RBV helps to distinguish the 
core competences and provides knowledge about which activities must be performed in-
house and which must be outsourced” (p.53). More specifically, Galanaki, Bourantas, and 
Papalexandris (2008) applied RBV to develop a decision model to help companies 
determine which, if any, of the training functions may be outsourced. According to 
Espino-Rodriguez and Padron-Robaina (2006), a firm’s resources can be any production 
factors that are available to that company. Each organization has different tendencies in 
exploiting their resources, evaluating their values, and assembling them together in order 
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to produce their final products or services (Han, Lee, & Seo, 2008). Han et al. (2008) 
further stated that the ways in which performance can differ significantly depends on how 
organizations orchestrate their resources together. Adopting appropriate IT governance 
mechanisms was found to help companies reduce risk and establish ‘best practices’ in the 
IT functions (Wessels & Loggerenberg, 2006).   
2.2.2 The Resource-Based View and Internal Capabilities 
It is well understood that knowledge is one of the scarce resources that can 
explain, in part, differences in marketplace performance. Under the Knowledge-Based 
View (KBV), knowledge is believed to be the key driver of competitive advantage and 
firm scope (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992). After analyzing data collected from 
129 companies, Ravichandran and Lertwongsatien (2005) concluded that a firm’s IT 
capabilities had contributed to firm performance. The study also found a causal 
relationship between internal IT resources and IT capabilities, as well as a company’s IT 
capability and its IT support for core competencies. These relationships illustrate the path 
dependencies that companies have while using IT to complement and pursue their firm 
strategies.  
Besides ensuring their management teams have skills to manage IT outsourcing 
engagements, companies must be sure that they have sufficient technical resources in-
house to be able to clearly articulate their expected outcomes from their outsourcing 
initiatives and to develop precise measurements to track their progresses (Barthelemy, 
2001). Furthermore, Mudambi and Tallman (2010) suggested that the "more knowledge a 
company has in a particular field, the easier it is to manage inter-firm relationships and to 
profit from external knowledge retention" (p. 1439). This observation is termed 
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“connective capability”, which is one of the six knowledge capabilities that Lichtenthaler 
and Lichtenthaler (2009) have identified as a critical capability responsible for managing 
internal and external knowledge exploration, retention, and exploitation.  
Customer organizations with a history of increasing efforts in developing 
technological skills may gain in competitive advantage over their counterparts that do not 
commit to internal resource development (Kor, 2001; Kor & Mahoney, 2005). According 
to Itami (1987), corporate competencies are essentially information-based invisible 
assets, which include management skills, and technological capability (Pucik, 1988). 
Because competencies are embodied in employees within the organization, they represent 
a type of tacit knowledge that is difficult to imitate (Teece, 1987). Tacit knowledge is a 
type of knowledge that embeds in an individual’s personal experience and involves 
intangible elements, such as personal belief and values, which make it difficult to be 
articulated or codified (Polanyi, 1992; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). 
As such, Itmai (1987) further suggested that accumulation of such invisible assets 
could be seen as a foundation for sustainable competitive advantage. Twenty years later, 
Kang, Morris, and Snell (2007) also reiterated that a firm's accumulated skills were the 
foundation for its core competencies; the flow of that knowledge was the key enabler to 
help it refine, and expand those critical skills.  
One way that a corporation can accumulate competencies is through 
organizational learning. Levitt and March (1988) defined four sources of organizational 
learning: 
1. Learning from direct experience: Corporations enrich their organizational experience 
through either trial-and-error experimentation or through organizational search, which 
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represents the approach in which organizations draw from a pool of alternative 
routines and then adopt the better ones that they have discovered. The organization 
learns by doing.    
2. Interpretation of experience: Although causality of events is often ambiguous and is 
subject to individual or group bias, organizations do form interpretations of events 
and classify their outcomes as good or bad.  
3. Organizational memory: “Rules, procedures, technologies, beliefs, and cultures are 
conserved through systems of socialization and control. They are retrieved through 
mechanisms of attention within a memory structure” (Levitt & March, 1988, p. 326).  
The approaches that an organization uses to maintain and consult its organizational 
memory structure has direct impact on how that organization reuses its experience 
and sets its future path.    
4. Learning from the experience of others: Organizations learn from other companies 
through the transfer of encoded knowledge in the form of technologies, procedures, or 
similar routines.      
Although the first three sources could be adversely affected by outsourcing—
because the temporary nature of outsourcing weakens the traditions and routines 
associated with a strong organizational culture (Pucik, 1988)—an organization can 
enhance its competencies by learning from its outsourcing vendors. However, a firm’s 
absorptive capacity for new information and knowledge is limited by its current 
knowledge endowment (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Cohen and Levinthal (1990) defined 
absorptive capacity as the company’s ability “to recognize the value of new, external 
information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (p.128) and suggested that 
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this ability was critical to a company’s innovative capabilities. Kor and Mahoney (2005) 
also stated that a firm’s past investments in its technical skills could have continued 
economic value in the present and in the future because these investments could help that 
firm absorb new knowledge more efficiently. With strong internal technical forces 
working with the vendors throughout the project lifecycle, customers will increase their 
chance of learning relevant skills through the transactions. These inter-firm interactions 
raise the customer firm’s possibility of reusing such knowledge in the future, which is 
important for sustaining a competitive advantage (Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009).  
Recent RBV work promotes knowledge gathering and integration (Newbert, 
2007), so that a company can increase its stock of a resource—in this case, knowledge—
and further its competitive advantage by using this new information as a catalyst for 
transforming its existing knowledge (Mayer, 2006). At the very least, such knowledge 
can be redeployed in a different area in order to extend the benefits that the knowledge 
brings (Teece et al., 1997). Furthermore, keeping a sufficient level of internal IT 
expertise will also help transferring the outsourced service to another service provider or 
back to in-house at the end of the contract (Barthelemy, 2001).   
In summary, the company’s internal technical capabilities (Lichtenthaler & 
Lichtenthaler, 2009) and the experience of the company’s management team in handling 
its outsourcing engagements and integrating these supplemental resources in the best 
possible manner (Kor & Mahoney, 2005) are two of the key contributing factors that can 
help determine whether companies can enjoy more benefits from their outsourcing 
endeavors. This dissertation will investigate the relationship between each of these two 
factors and the managerial perceptions of the outsourcing success. 
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2.3 The Relational View 
After studying the industry structure view and the RBV regarding the sources of 
competitive advantage, Dyer and Singh (1998) argued that the sources of supernormal 
returns may not be limited to those that are housed within the firm as suggested by those 
two prominent views. Instead, “the (dis)advantages of an individual firm are often linked 
to the (dis)advantages of the network of relationships in which the firm is embedded” 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998, p.660). Haried and Ramamurthy (2009) also echoed that a firm’s 
critical resources may span firm boundaries and may also be embedded in inter-firm 
resources. Rather than using the firm as the primary unit of analysis, as proposed by both 
the TCE and the RBV, the relational view of competitive advantage focused on using 
dyad/network routine and processes as the unit of analysis. As indicated by Gulati, 
Nohria, and Zaheer (2000), a network approach allows consideration of strategic benefits 
from optimizing not just a single relationship but the firm’s entire network of 
relationships. The Relational View of the firm suggests that a firm’s relationships with its 
business trading partners are essential for understanding how it can achieve competitive 
advantage (Dyer & Singh, 1998).  
The Relational View further argued that supernormal relational rents could be 
generated when business partners combine, exchange, or invest in idiosyncratic 
relationship-specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines, and complementary 
resources/capabilities endowments. In addition, relational rents can also be realized when 
business partners “employ effective governance mechanisms that lower transaction costs 
or permit the realization of rents through the synergistic combination of assets, 
knowledge, or capabilities” (Dyer & Singh, 1998, p. 662). Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer 
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(2000) later added that this type of partnership building was not a one-time investment 
and it indeed required continuous maintenance before it could flourish. In order to 
maintain rent generation abilities, companies need to initiate necessary changes to the 
partnership as it evolves while also managing partner expectations (Gulati, Nohria, & 
Zaheer, 2000). 
Since it was introduced by Dyer and Singh (1998), the Relational View has been 
used in various research areas. Poppo and Zenger (2002) suggested relational norms, such 
as trust, could be used as substitutes for complex, explicit contracts during market 
exchange. Literature in economics and sociology has generally viewed relational 
governance and formal contracts as substitutes (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Gulati (1995) 
argued that the presence of one governance device could obviate the need for the other. 
Furthermore, trust and reputation, as a form of self-enforcement could increase relational 
rents because it could minimize transaction costs as compared to formal contracts (Dyer 
& Singh, 1998). The Relational View has also been used to explain how firms chose their 
preferred way to govern relationship with their outsourcing partners (Barthelemy, 2003).  
Recently, the Relational View was used to explain the reason behind suggesting 
companies in R&D intensive industries to take advantage of the complementing 
resources of their partners (Mol, 2005). Dyer and Singh (1998) suggested that “firms who 
combine resources in unique ways may realize an advantage over competing firms who 
are unable or unwilling to do so” (p.661). The Relational View was also being used to 
discuss the benefit of early supplier integration (Gassmann, 2006). Studies found that 
suppliers could enhance the success of a firm’s innovation projects by contributing their 
specific capabilities (Sobrero & Roberts, 2002). According to Hagedoorn (1993), 
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suppliers’ early involvement in the innovation process increases innovation performance 
in most industries. The Relational View of setting up differentiated relationships with 
suppliers early was said to allow companies enjoy significant benefit (Gassmann, 2006). 
Samaddar and Kadiyala (2006) also used the Relational View to explore and confirm the 
important of trust in governing inter-firm relationship in Korea. Data showed that 
“Korean company is governed by a lesser degree of contractual completeness and more 
by trust in its outsourcing relationship” (Samaddar & Kadiyala, 2006, p.922). After 
analyzing various complementary and, sometimes, contradictory theories that had been 
used to ground the studies of the outsourcing phenomenon, Perunovic and Pedersen 
(2007) associated those theories with different phases of the outsourcing process and 
concluded that the Relational View was the only one that had been applied in all five 
phases of the outsourcing process, which included preparation, vendor(s) selection, 
transition, managing relationship, and reconsideration. Drawing on the Relational View 
of the firm, Fink (2010) proposed a framework that identified four high-level dimensions 
that corresponded to an organization's resource position in four key areas: organizational 
IT value position, organizational IT asset position, relational asset position, and relational 
capability position. Last year, Ndubisi (2011) reported that the Relational View had also 
been utilized in studying the transition, managing relationship and reconsideration phases 
of the inter-organizational relationship building process. It confirmed that self-
enforcement did play a significant facilitating role in conflict handling between business 
partners (Ndubisi, 2011).  
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2.3.1 The Relational View and IT Outsourcing 
Along with the RBV, the Relational View has been considered as one of the two 
main paradigms in strategic management theories used to explain outsourcing (Chadee & 
Raman, 2009). Since it was introduced by Dyer & Singh (1998), the Relational View has 
been used in substantial IT outsourcing related literature to discuss the use of formal and 
informal governance mechanisms in managing outsourcing relationship (Barthelemy, 
2003); to prescribe ways to nurture rent-generating abilities from outsourcing partners 
(Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000); to support the idea of keeping a small but active 
suppliers network (Manhnke, Overby & Vang, 2005); and to explain how a self-
enforcement governance mechanism was a preferred approach in handling inter-firm 
relationships (Poppo and Zenger, 2002).  
According to the Relational View, companies will outsource business functions if 
relational rents can be generated from inter-organization knowledge sharing, 
complementary resource endowments, or effective governance (Dyer and Singh, 1998). 
Supernormal rents can be generated when partners invest in relation-specific assets and 
companies will be more willing to outsource when these investments are likely to yield a 
satisfactory return for all firms involved. However, the Relational View does not presume 
that combinations of different firms’ resources alone will create competitive advantages. 
Instead, relational rents will be created through the continuous successful evolvement of 
the IT vendor - outsourcer relationship (Manhnke, Overby & Vang, 2005).  
Due to the significant resources required to invest in relation-specific assets, 
partner-specific absorptive capability, and in identifying partners with complementary 
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resources that can be realized, the Relational View argues that firms can increase profits 
by increasing their dependence on a smaller number of IT service providers (Manhnke, 
Overby & Vang, 2005). With a limited amount of business partners, companies can focus 
on communicating objectives, setting proper expectations, and building relationships to 
promote risk and benefit sharing in order to develop a win-win situation for all parties 
involved (Lee & Kim, 1999). Because partner-specific absorptive capability can be 
enhanced when partners “get to know each other well enough to know what and where 
critical expertise resides within each firm” (Dyer & Singh, 1998, p.665), a smaller 
number of service providers will ensure outsourcers be able to devote sufficient resources 
to build their relationships with their vendors. Furthermore, as Barthelemy (2003) 
suggested, trust generally develops over the course of a relationship. Dyer and Ouchi 
(1993) also stated that direct contact, such as through face-to-face meetings, was crucial 
to developing trust between the client and the vendor. A large number of service 
providers may dilute outsourcing companies’ abilities to develop mutual trust with their 
business partners. Because the Relational View advocates the use of self-enforcement in 
place of third-party enforcement, a smaller number of strategic service providers will be 
more favorable in generating relational rents.  
Scholars also used the Relational View to strengthen their discussions in specific 
types of IT outsourcing projects. One of the potential sources of inter-organizational 
competitive advantage is inter-firm knowledge-sharing routines, which were defined as 
regular inter-firm interactions that permit the transfer, assimilate, or creation of 
specialized knowledge (Dyer & Singh, 1998). This implies a mutual interdependence 
between outsourcers and service providers to achieve an arrangement’s potential 
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(Manhnke, Overby & Vang, 2005). Mahnke (2001) thus argued that this type of relational 
rent-generating source might be more relevant for discussion in business process 
outsourcing, where interfaces between components might be specified more fully, as 
compared to infrastructure outsourcing arrangements. Studies also found support that 
self-enforcement governance mechanisms, such as trust and reputation were suitable 
complements of formal contract in outsourcing engagements. As suggested by Poppo & 
Zenger, (2002), governance emerges from values and agreed-upon processes found in 
social relationships that could minimize transaction costs as compared to formal 
contracts. 
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CHAPTER III 
Hypothesis Development 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains detailed discussions on key relationships in the model and 
their associated hypotheses. The first section introduces the types of governance 
mechanisms that are used in this study. The second section discusses how a firm’s 
internal technological capabilities moderate the relationship between contract type and 
outsourcing success.  
Outsourcing success has been evaluated by other scholars through single item 
measures such as satisfaction (Kim & Chung, 2003; Rouse & Corbitt, 2003), cost saving 
(Karpathiou & Tanner, 1995; Lacity & Willcocks, 2001; Saunder, Gebelt, & Hu, 1997), 
and vendor performance (Kern, 1999). Clearly, cost saving most frequently was used to 
gauge outsourcing success. This coincides with the TCE perspective. For example, Lacity 
and Willcoks (2001) reported that 53% of their survey respondents obtained cost saving 
through IT outsourcing, which was 10 percentage points higher than another study done 
by Rouse and Corbitt (2003). However, Rouse (2006) explained that “cost saving” itself 
may not be sufficient in measuring outsourcing success. Rouse (2006) explained that 
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“this measure fails to recognize that reduced costs accompanied by reduction in services 
or quality are not necessarily valuable to an organization. Nor does it recognize that the 
organization may be seeking alternative benefits, such as greater business flexibility, or 
converting capital costs to expenses that may, in the short term, involve additional costs 
to the firm” (p. 2). This juxtaposition of cost versus resource accumulation and use is at 
the heart of the differing perspectives of TCE and the RBV and the trade-offs between 
efficiency and effectiveness objectiveness. 
Instead of assessing cost savings alone, Grover, Cheon, and Teng (1996) proposed 
that outsourcing success should be evaluated from both technical (RBV) and economic 
(TCE) perspectives. Besides the obvious economic benefit that many scholars have 
already measured, Grover et al. (1996) also examined strategic benefits, specifically 
measuring the degree that outsourcing helped customers refocus their core business and 
enhanced their IT competence. Furthermore, this study also evaluated technical benefits, 
which included how much outsourcing had impacted customers’ access to key 
information technologies and how much outsourcing reduced the risk of customers 
experiencing technological obsolescence. This study’s viewpoint of looking beyond the 
economic dimension was also shared by other studies such as Karpathou and Tanner 
(1995), Lee and Kim (1999), and Han, Lee, and Soe (2008). This dissertation adopts the 
outsourcing success dimensions as measured by Grover et al. (1996), including strategic 
(via strategic governance mechanisms), technical, and economic benefits.     
3.2 Governance of IT Outsourcing 
IT governance can be seen as the alignment of strategy and operations across 
business and IT in support of business objectives. In fact, some authors agree that 
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although strategy is important, without governance, it is impossible to achieve desired 
results and thus, governance has an even bigger role in the success of outsourcing 
ventures (Cohen & Young, 2006; Cullen & Willcocks, 2003). For example, Cohen and 
Young (2006) indicated that “[effective] sourcing governance is more important to long-
term sourcing success than any other factor” (p. 113). The rationale behind this belief is 
that governance mechanisms set up rules and structure for good decisions to be made by 
all parties involved without the need for continuous monitoring. Even if a company is 
still in the process of developing a strategy, adequate governance can help that company 
achieve positive outcomes from existing sourcing relationships and can help the company 
keep its outsourcing projects under control.  
Strategy researchers have long argued that achieving competitive advantage 
depends upon a company’s ability to use existing stocks of resources rather than simply 
having the resource. As Mahoney and Pandian (1992) stated, “A firm may achieve rents 
not because it has better resources, but rather the firm’s distinctive competence involves 
making better use of its resources” (p. 365). A company can appropriate extra returns 
when it possesses the ability to integrate available resources (Becerra, 2008). Mahoney 
and Pandian (1992) also suggested that the company’s ability to effectively evaluate the 
strength and weakness of its resource position could result in a stronger basis for 
competitive advantage. Being able to choose appropriate governance mechanisms for 
each outsourcing scenario translates to a better use of limited resources, which often 
means delivering a better result for the company than it otherwise can experience. 
Depending upon the underlying philosophy of how the business exchanges are being 
enforced, governance mechanisms can be grouped into two major categories, namely 
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formal and informal (Behrens, 2006). The following sections discuss these two distinct 
forms of governance mechanisms in detail.  
3.2.1 Formal governance mechanisms 
Formal mechanisms are those that can be codified by contract or explicitly 
embodied within the regulatory framework of a relationship. They include depersonalized 
exchanges, which are considered to be open market purchases (Williamson, 1991), as 
well as “a reliance on financial parameters, and the drafting and implementation of 
formal contracts” (Ferguson, Paulin, & Bergeron, 2005, p. 217), with the most frequently 
analyzed mechanism being that of formal contracts (Jahner, Bohmann, & Krcmar, 2006). 
However, even though formal contracts have been analyzed frequently by scholars, 
Jahner et al. (2006) showed that they are not always useful as an explanatory variable 
because of their consistency and widespread use. Additionally, some contracts have 
proven to be both costly and inflexible for both parties (Gil, 2009), sometimes hampering 
future adaptation. 
A type of formal governance mechanisms includes financial commitment. 
Williamson (1985) has stated that financial commitment is another approach that can help 
reduce the incentive for opportunism. Yu, Liao, and Lin (2006) defined financial 
commitment as any type of business ties involving commitments of financial resources. 
Scholars such as De Vita et al. (2010) suggested that vendors’ financial commitment to 
their engagements contributed positively to their relationship with their customers. As 
such, mutual financial commitment between the outsourcer and the outsourcee should 
have a positive effect on managerial perceptions of IT outsourcing performance. 
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If one company has a financial commitment to a business arrangement, it likely 
will have additional incentives to maintain relationships. Much literature has supported 
the importance of financial commitment. According to Williamson (1985), financial 
commitments may mitigate adversarial relationships between cooperative partners. 
Zaheer and Venketraman (1995) also claim that financial commitments are similar to 
hostage-taking in the sense that they are designed to eliminate opportunistic behavior. De 
Vita et al. (2010) concluded that service providers’ dedicated asset-specific investments 
contributed significantly to their relationship with their customers.  
Yu, Liao, and Lin (2006) also believe that financial commitments are useful in 
protecting unethical behavior and unchecked self-interest. From the perspective of the 
Relational View, Dyer (1996) indicated that site-specific investments created physical 
proximity, which provided interfirm cooperation and coordination. This increased 
relational rents and thereby enhanced performance. The financial commitment also 
"lengthens the 'shadow of the future' by signaling good-faith intentions and long-term 
commitments" (Dyer, 1997, p. 548). Because of the additional incentives to maintain a 
harmonistic relationship when customers have made a financial commitment into the 
outsourcing projects, managers will be more willing to work with their vendors during 
their outsourcing engagements. The outsourcing experience for purchasing managers will 
also be further enhanced when their vendors do not exhibit opportunistic behavior 
because those vendors have dedicated asset-specific investments in their projects and do 
not want to jeopardize their relationship with their customers. Therefore: 
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H1:  Financial commitment in the form of dedicated asset-specific investments by 
both the outsourcer and the outsourcee is positively related to managerial perceptions of 
IT outsourcing success. 
3.2.2 Informal governance mechanisms  
Informal governance mechanisms include three general categories: trust, which is 
composed of benevolent trust and calculative trust, commitment, and relational 
contracting (Behrens, 2006; Goo, Kishore, Nam, Rao, & Song, 2007; Granovetter, 1985; 
Yu, Liao, & Lin, 2006).  
As stated by Ness and Haugland (2003) informal mechanisms of calculative trust 
and benevolent trust can affect the development and expansion of inter-firm relationships, 
and have strong impact on outsourcing success. Calculative trust has been defined 
through the perception of trust as a form of economic exchange (Lewicki & Bunker, 
1996). Individuals are assumed to be economically rational beings motivated by their 
desire to maximize expected gains or minimize expected losses in their transactions 
(Kramer, 1999). With that in mind, calculative trust is an ongoing, market-oriented 
economic evaluation where each party assesses the benefits and costs to be derived from 
creating and sustaining a relationship (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). As calculative trust is 
being evaluated constantly throughout the partnership, initial trust between service 
receiver and service provider is important to both parties in maintaining ongoing trust in 
their relationship (Lee & Choi, 2011). Furthermore, Ali et al. (2007) found that cultural 
understanding, communication strategies, contract conformance, and timely delivery 
were also crucial in maintaining ongoing trust.  
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Interviews conducted by Muehlberger (2005) indicated that the success of longer 
term relationships was positively affected by calculative trust. Dyer and Singh (1998) 
also stated that when business partners found creditable assurances that they would be 
rewarded for staying within the partnership, they would be more likely to engage in 
sharing tacit knowledge and unique resources. Further, calculative trust has been shown 
to act as a moderating factor between formal governance mechanisms and transaction-
specific investments and has a significant impact on single transaction outsourcing 
relationships (Yu et al., 2006). Subsequently, Goo et al. (2007) developed a multi-level 
model and indicated that change management and foundation characteristics contributed 
positively and significantly to the development of calculative trust. Further, they found 
that, as a governance mechanism, calculative trust contributed to managers’ perceived 
success of IT outsourcing. Thus: 
H2: Calculative trust is positively related to managerial perceptions of IT 
outsourcing success.   
In addition to calculative trust, benevolent trust also has been explored in the 
literature. Behrens (2006) suggested benevolent trust could enhance outcomes in complex 
outsourcing projects with high uncertainty. The main theme of Behrens’ (2006) study 
was that perceptions of outsourcing outcomes was “a function of the congruence - or fit - 
between the governance scheme employed to manage it and the characteristics of the 
relationship's context" (Behrens, 2006, p. 108). For the outsourcing projects that have 
high uncertainty and structural complexity, "the establishment of mutual trust and 
relational norms between the outsourcing partners becomes crucial" to the success of 
these engagements (Behrens, 2006, p. 111). Previous studies of interorganizational 
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relations or networks have been able to show that trust can produce economic value 
through the prevention of opportunistic behavior and incomplete contracting 
(Muehlberger, 2005). McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer (2003) also suggested that trust has 
positive effect on the performance of inter-organizational exchanges.   
Black (2008) defined benevolent trust as the extent to which one party believes, 
given the possibility of unforeseen conditions, that the other party has intentions and 
motives that will benefit both parties. Larzelere and Huston (1980) asserted that mutual 
trust could only exist to the extent that one party believes the other is benevolent and 
honest. McAllister (1995) further explored the emotional aspect of benevolent trust and 
stated that emotional ties between two parties could provide the basis for trust. Kiessling 
and Harvey (2004) later added that the benevolent dimension of trust emphasizes the 
motives and intentions of the outsourcing partner. This governance mechanism also 
focuses on the qualities, intentions, and characteristics attributed to the other party as 
opposed to specific behaviors (Ganesan, 1994). Since then, The results of an empirical 
study on the impact of this construct has been mixed. After analyzing 115 valid responses 
from their survey conducted with companies in mainland China, Tian, Lai, and Daniel 
(2008) found that prior interactions with a service provider, the provider’s relationship-
specific investment, the provider’s information sharing, and the provider’s reputation are 
key determinants of logistics users’ level of trust towards their third party providers. Ali 
Babar, Verner, and Nguyen (2007) also identified that cultural understanding, 
creditability, capabilities, and personal visits are important factors that customers 
consider when they engage off-shore service providers. However, Yu, Liao, and Lin 
(2006) did not find significant relationship between benevolent trust and transaction-
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specific investments. White (2005) also reported that benevolence was not a strong driver 
on purchasing decision. Given these inconsistent results, and the high correlation between 
benevolent trust and commitment discovered by other scholars such as Morgan and Hunt 
(1994), this study will not include benevolent trust and will focus on the impact of 
commitment to the managers’ perception of outsourcing success instead.  
When investigating the determinants of IT outsourcing success, Goo et al. (2007) 
found that commitment was one of the key components that contributed to that outcome. 
Commitment has been defined as “an implicit or explicit pledge of relational continuity 
between exchange partners” (Dwyer et al., 1987, p. 13). It has further been specified, 
similar to trust, as multidimensional, including calculative and attitudinal factors (Black, 
2008). The calculative aspect relates to the extent to which one firm or organization is 
bound to another firm or organization through extraneous interests as opposed to a 
favorable disposition towards the organization (Srinivasan & Brush, 2006). Similar to 
calculative trust, the rational aspect of cost-benefit analysis plays a significant role in the 
formation of calculative commitment (Srinivasan & Brush, 2006).  
On the other hand, attitudinal commitment indicated that one firm would identify 
with its outsourcing partner(s) and therefore be committed to maintaining the relationship 
to pursue the interests of both itself and its outsourcing partner(s) (McGee & Ford, 1987). 
This governance mechanism can be defined as an affective attachment to the outcomes of 
not only the initiating firm, but also the partner firm in the outsourcing relationship 
(Allen & Meyer, 1990). Poppo and Zenger (2002) also suggested that IT outsourcing is a 
good candidate for the use of commitment to help overcome the adaptive limits of formal 
contracts. It further stressed that this type of relational governance mechanism “may help 
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overcome the adaptive limits of contracts: a bilateral commitment to ‘keep-on-with-it’ 
despite the unexpected complications and conflicts” (Poppo & Zenger, 2002, p. 708). 
Itami (1987) stated that commitment can help supplement formal contract in partnership 
management because of the nature of having commitment, where two organizations 
cooperate toward ambiguous outcomes that involve the exchange of invisible assets. 
Drawing on the self-enforcement governance style of the Relational View, Ndbubisi 
(2011) studied conflict handling typologies that affect trust and commitment in B2B 
outsourcing relationship and found that commitment had significant impact on conflict 
handling in outsourcing relationship. Thus:  
H3: Attitudinal commitment is positively related to managerial perceptions of IT 
outsourcing success. 
Relational contracting focuses on cumulative contributions of individual business 
transactions within larger economic and social interactions between firms (Granovetter, 
1985). Instead of relying on third party intervention to deter opportunism, relational 
contracting uses reputation (Gil, 2009; Larson, 1992; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988), 
continuity (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006), and trust (Powell, 1990; Sako, 1991; Uzzi, 
1997) to sustain the inter-organizational business transactions. However, relational 
contracting is unlikely to serve sufficiently as a sole governance mechanism in the 
outsourcing exchanges with external vendors. Instead, Poppo and Zenger (2002) have 
argued that legal contracts and relational governance should complement each other 
instead of replacing one another.   
Poppo and Zenger (2002) observed that relational governance supported by 
mutual trust was commonly viewed as a substitute for complex contracts in inter-
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organizational exchanges. They further discovered that governance, emerging from 
values and agreed-upon processes found in social relationships, could be an effective way 
of minimizing the transaction costs that a company might have to spend on more 
elaborate contracts. By relying on relational governance, customers can reduce the risk of 
inadequate contractual provision, which will in turn increase the chance of outsourcing 
managers having better working experiences from their outsourcing projects. Thus, 
informal governance mechanisms will have a positive effect on perceptions of IT 
outsourcing performance. 
With incomplete contracts, ex-post negotiations sometimes subject a company to 
delays. For the previously mentioned scenarios, a sociological approach suggests that a 
better tactic to combat such uncertainty depends less on extensive traditional contracting 
and more on relational contracts to facilitate adaptation (Carson et al., 2006). Baker, 
Gibbons, and Murphy (2001) described relational contracts as informal agreements that 
were sustained by the value of future relationships. The Relational View also suggested 
longer term relationships, as well as greater volume (scale) and breadth (scope) could 
have positive effects on protecting business partners against opportunism (Dyer & Singh, 
1998). Dyer (1997) found that suppliers for Japanese automakers with more specialized 
suppliers group, such as Toyota, were more willing to invest heavily in relation-specific 
assts. This type of automaker also enjoyed lower transactions costs than their competitors 
with less specialized suppliers group. The expectation of long-term relationships, which 
provided a longer payback period during which suppliers could earn a return on the 
investments, was the reason provided that allowed automakers to “simultaneously 
achieve the twin benefits of asset specialization and lower transaction costs" (Dyer, 1997, 
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p. 552). Gil (2009) added that relational contracts “emphasize future cooperative 
behavior, reciprocity, and mutual dependence” (p. 145). As part of the larger business 
relationship, opportunism may be reduced because of possible spillovers from one bad 
transaction to another. Similarly, some scholars also argued that relational contracting is 
the most effective and least costly governance mechanism to manage a complex 
exchange (Sako, 1991; Uzzi, 1997) because it helps reduce transaction costs incurred 
through negotiation and monitoring efforts, thereby enhancing perceived performance 
(Barney & Hansen, 1994; Sako, 1991).  
H4: Relational contracts in the form of continuing possible future business 
relationships are positively related to managerial perceptions of IT outsourcing success. 
The above-mentioned formal and informal governance mechanisms are used in 
the current study as independent variables for the first four hypotheses. The formal 
mechanisms--financial commitments—were chosen for their consistency and frequent 
use (Jahner et al., 2006; Williamson, 1985). The informal mechanisms—calculative trust, 
attitudinal commitment, and possible future business relationships—were chosen because 
of their previous widespread use in the literature and their relationships with other factor 
variables, such as outsourcing experience (Leiblein & Miller, 2003). 
3.3 Moderating Effect of Internal Technological Capability 
 
As mentioned earlier, a company achieves sustainable competitive advantage 
when it implements a value-creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by 
any current or potential competitors and when these other firms are unable to duplicate 
the benefits of this strategy within a foreseeable future. The RBV suggests that unique, 
tangible resources and intangible resources and capabilities are the foundation for an 
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organization to gain competitive advantages in the marketplace (Fahy, 2000; Grant, 
1991). Furthermore, strategy researchers have argued that achieving sustained 
competitive advantage depends upon the firm’s ability to use existing stocks of resources 
(Grant, 1996), refine its existing knowledge stocks (Kang, Morris, & Snell, 2007), and 
accumulate new resource stocks more efficiently and effectively relative to its 
competitors (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). The RBV perceives the firm as a unique 
bundle of idiosyncratic resources and capabilities. Any input that is either owned or 
controlled by the company and that contributes to the production of goods and services 
should be considered part of that firm’s resources (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). The 
primary task of management is to maximize value through the optimal deployment of 
existing resources and capabilities, while developing the firm's resource base for the 
future (Grant, 1996).   
In the case of outsourcing, the firm is moving a critical function out of the 
organization because of cost considerations, per TCE; however, moving the entire 
function out leaves the firm at risk because effectiveness may be lost, per the RBV.  
Kor and Mahoney (2005) also stated that a firm’s past investments in its technical 
skills could have continued economic value in the present and in the future because 
these investments could help that firm absorb new knowledge more efficiently. Thus, 
it is necessary for a firm to retain internal technological capabilities in order for it to 
optimize its experience and enjoy more benefits from its outsourcing arrangement. It 
can thus be deduced that a firm’s internal technological capability will moderate the 
relationship between governance mechanisms and managerial perceptions of IT 
outsourcing success. 
63 
 
 Knowledge asymmetry is known to be one of the potential drivers of 
opportunism (Flinders, 2010); a more knowledgeable technical team can help in 
narrowing the knowledge asymmetry between the outsourcing company and its venders. 
Reducing knowledge asymmetry will enhance executives’ visibility of their outsourcing 
initiatives, which can help them manage these projects better.  
Furthermore, Arrow (1962) suggested that hands-on experience provided learning 
opportunities that would enhance a firm’s production capabilities: “Such experientially 
derived capabilities improve subsequent production along a given trajectory in terms of 
both efficiency and technical performance” (Leiblein & Miller, 2003, p. 846). However, 
outsourcing can reduce client’s learning-by-doing experience, which can have negative 
impact on the client’s ability to integrate their IT activities into their business functions 
(Cha, Pingry, & Thatcher, 2009). Experience with related technology has found to help 
companies enjoy a slower knowledge decline rate when they outsource their IT functions 
to their external venders because internal technical capabilities helped the outsourcing 
client be better able to acquire a portion of its service provider’s relevant and useful 
knowledge (Cha et al., 2009).  
Lazonick and Prencipe (2005) found that an internal ability to strategically control 
financial commitments is a necessary condition for innovation. In order to exercise 
strategic control, companies must have a sufficient internal technological capability to 
understand and execute their visions. By the same token, companies with sufficient 
internal technical capability are more able to monitor and guide the usage of their 
financial commitment for their outsourcing engagements. Technical expertise has been 
64 
 
found to be an important factor that directly impacts the quality of one’s decision and 
reduces the uncertainty linked to adverse selection (Ferrary, 2003).  
However, in the case of asset-specific investments, these often are done by the 
outsourcee, rather the outsourcer, per se.  Thus, the direct effects on perception of the 
outsourcer are less apparent.  Being better at allocating and monitoring their outsourcee 
partners’ asset-specific commitments may help companies to maintain control and to 
mitigate potential risk, which in turn will enhance the perceptions of outsourcing success. 
Because the impact of technological capabilities on the outsourcing manager’s perceived 
outsourcing experience occurs indirectly through the outsourcee’s asset-specific 
commitments, asset-specific commitments in this study are behaving as a moderator. (A 
moderator is a qualitative or quantitative variable that affects the direction or strength of 
the relation between a predictor variable and an outcome (Baron & Kenny, 1986). It 
addresses “when” or “for whom” a predictor is more strongly related to an outcome 
(Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004). In some cases, it can be used to provide explanation of 
unexpected weak or inconsistent relations between a predictor and an outcome (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986)). Thus:        
 H5a: A firm’s technological capabilities moderates the relationship between 
asset-specific investments and managerial perception of IT outsourcing success. 
Besides being able to better handle their financial commitments, companies with 
higher technological capabilities are also in a better position to evaluate another party's 
ability to meet their obligations (Doney & Cannon, 1997). Dyer and Singh (1998) also 
suggested that firms with higher levels of expertise might “have a more precise view on 
the kinds of partner/resource combination that allow them to generate supernormal 
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returns” (p. 667). This critical information can help outsourcers weigh the costs and 
benefits of staying with their vendors, which is the foundation of calculative trust. 
Technical competence is said to be an important factor in the emergence of trust between 
companies (Abrams, Cross, Lesser, & Levin, 2003). This is especially true during the 
early stage of partnership, when ambiguities and uncertainties often exist (Kelly, Schaan, 
& Joncas, 2002). In the context of employing formal governance mechanisms, Mayer and 
Salomon (2006) suggested that companies with strong technological capabilities would 
be better equipped to design outsourcing contracts with the right amount of detail, 
including contingency planning and incentives. This helps companies to set proper 
expectations and to avoid misunderstanding. They further stated that "Strong 
technological capabilities may even help a firm craft better ex ante contracts to clearly 
define the roles and responsibilities of each party, specify the knowledge to be 
exchanged, identify appropriate milestones, stipulate monitoring mechanisms, and 
introduce appropriate pecuniary incentives" (Mayer & Salomon, 2006, p.945). With 
better contracts and monitoring mechanisms in place, outsourcing managers will feel 
more at ease because they have better control via the ability to rely on relevant 
contractual clauses in case their service providers do not behave in accordance to their 
agreements. Thus: 
H5b: A firm’s technological capabilities moderates the relationship between 
calculative trust and managerial perception of IT outsourcing success. 
As mentioned previously, attitudinal commitment is the amount that the 
outsourcing firm can identify with its services providers, which affects the degree that the 
outsourcing firm will commit to maintaining the relationship. Because IT outsourcing 
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service providers all are technology companies in nature, outsourcing companies with 
higher technological capabilities will be able to relate to these partners better and will be 
more willing to make attitudinal commitments to their relationships. This aligns with one 
of the findings in the work by Gulati and Sytch (2008), who found that similarity 
significantly enhanced the ability of exchange partners to translate this familiarity factor 
“into a stock of trust” (p.165). Furthermore, outsourcers who possess higher 
technological capabilities can reduce information asymmetries between business partners 
(Ferrary, 2003). Because knowledge is accumulative (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), Dyer 
and Singh (1998) stated that the ability to exploit outside sources of knowledge is largely 
a function of the absorptive capacity of the outsourcer. Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler 
(2009) also echoed that observation and suggested that the higher a company’s internal 
technological capabilities are, the easier it is to learn relevant skills through exchanges 
with service providers during outsourcing engagements, which is important for sustaining 
a competitive advantage. Zahay and Handfield (2004) also indicated that learning 
capability was an important asset that managers recognize as key to successful 
deployment of relationship structuring, material flows, and information system 
deployment. In the context of informal governance mechanisms, knowledge sharing 
between service providers and outsourcing clients have been found to promote initial 
trust and ongoing trust within the outsourcing relationship (Lee & Choi, 2011). In 
addition, shared learning (a.k.a. team orientation) was also among the four organizational 
learning dimensions that were found to have significant impact on relationship 
commitment in the sourcing process (Zahay & Handfield, 2004). On the other hand, 
insufficient technological capability can hinder the relationship building between two 
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parties during outsourcing progress. For example, Dupont found that its inadequate 
architecture planning capability had caused it to not being able to have informed 
discussions with its vendors (Willcocks & Feeny, 2006). Therefore, it is hypothesized 
that technological capability of an outsourcing company will affect the development of 
attitudinal commitment, which in turn will impact the managerial perception of IT 
outsourcing success.  
H5c: A firm’s technological capabilities moderates the relationship between 
attitudinal commitment and managerial perception of IT outsourcing success. 
 
Figure 1: Proposed Model 
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CHAPTER IV 
Research methods 
 
 
4.1 Sample 
 
The population for the current study is comprised of business professionals who 
are members of the Information Systems Community of Practice in the Project 
Management Institute (PMI). PMI is the world’s leading not-for-profit membership 
association for the project management profession, with more than 600,000 members 
(PMI, 2012a). In order to promote members’ interaction and to build the body of 
knowledge in different industries and business areas, this organization has created 37 
communities of practice in total for their members. Based on members’ own business foci 
and interests, they are encouraged to participate in these communities. Information 
Systems Community of Practice is a community that networks members who are 
“interested in, working in, or impacted by developments in information systems project 
management” (PMI, 2012b). Its community members are likely to have extensive 
experience in the IT area and, thus, are an appropriate target for this study. In order for 
the managers to qualify for the study, they had to have direct involvement in their 
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organizations’ IT outsourcing initiatives. Through their direct involvement, these 
professionals had to have first-hand knowledge of their outsourcing engagements. 
4.1.1 Sampling plan  
The sampling frame for the study was comprised of managers who had managed 
IT outsourcing engagements in the past 24 months. When comparing results from a study 
done by the Forrester Research in 2010 and similar studies done by DiamondCluster 
International in 2005 and 2006, executives from the customer firms gave higher scores to 
their IT outsourcing vendors in 2010 than in earlier years (Martorelli, 2010; Thibodeau, 
2006; Weakland, 2005). This indicates users experiences in IT outsourcing engagements 
may be changing over time. By limiting the research pool to the managers who had 
managed IT outsourcing in the past 2 years, this study included data based on more recent 
experience. Based on previous studies, control variables such as organizational size, and 
revenue have not been found to affect outsourcing tactics (Grover, Cheon, & Teng, 
1996). Therefore, this study did not control for these size variables. 
For this study, the directory from the PMI Information Systems Community of 
Practice was used as the base for potential subjects. Surveys were distributed via email to 
all members of the Information Systems Community of Practices, whom are employed in 
varying industries.   
4.1.2 Sample size  
Sample size of any study is an important consideration, as having a large enough 
sample size makes it possible to generalize the target population, as well as have enough 
statistical power to be confident of the results. Furthermore, insufficient sample size 
reduces the likelihood of finding statistical significance. This increases the possibility of 
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researchers making a Type II error, or failing to find statistical significance when it 
actually exists (Balkin & Sheperis, 2011). For this current study, an “a priori” power 
analysis is being used to determine the minimum sample size by using appropriate power, 
effect size, and statistical significance. The power of the study is defined as the 
probability of rejecting a false null hypothesis (Cohen, 1988). It "is considered [as] an 
essential element in designing and evaluating quantitative findings for research" (Balkin 
& Sheperis, 2011). In order to reject the null hypothesis, the power should be at least 
0.80, which is the number that many researchers have used to ensure adequacy 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). Cohen (1988) suggested that the Type II error risk should 
be four times as great as the Type I error risk to ensure adequate analyses, without having 
to use unrealistically high sample sizes for social science research. Type I error refers to 
the issue of stating a statistical relationship between dependent and independent variables 
when one does not exist. Power levels lower than 0.80 will increase the chance of a 
Type II error to greater than 20% and higher levels of power may suggest higher sample 
sizes than necessary (Balkin & Sheperis, 2011). Therefore, Balkin and Sheperis (2011) 
also stated that the recommended adequate power is 0.80.  
Effect size is another essential element when calculating minimum sample size. It 
is the desired magnitude or strength of relationship between the predictor and dependent 
variables (Cohen, 1988). When determining the effect size, Cohen (1988) suggested three 
different levels: small, medium, and large, which correspond to the correlation values of 
0.10, 0.30, and 0.50 respectively. According to Cohen (1988), for the purpose of “a 
priori” power analysis to determine a minimum sample size, the medium effect size is 
appropriate.  
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Lastly, the statistical significance criterion is the possibility of having a 
substantial result when the null hypothesis is true. One of the most commonly used levels 
of significance is 0.05.  In this case, by adopting a power of 0.80, effect size of 0.30, and 
level of significance equal to 0.05 through the power analysis performed using the 
statistical G*Power software, the required sample size was calculated to be 64. Although 
this may seem to be a small sample, it is statistically representative of larger samples and 
was meant to serve as a base for developing further survey responses if necessary. 
While “a priori” power analysis is conducted prior to the research study for 
estimating sufficient sample sizes to achieve adequate power, post-hoc power analysis is 
conducted after a study has been completed to determine the power that the obtained 
sample size has provided. Scholars such as Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2004) have been 
advocating the use of post hoc power analyses because it "would help researchers 
determine whether low power threatens the internal validity of findings" (p. 204). Battle, 
Cowan, and Rakow (2000) also stated that researchers should “give readers a clearer 
picture of their findings by reporting the power post hoc.” For this study, a post hoc 
power analysis was conducted using the statistical G*Power 3 tool, as Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, and Buchner (2007) suggested. Scholars including Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2004) 
also credited G*Power as an “extremely useful” (p. 208) statistical software program that 
conducts power analyses. By using the same effect size of 0.30 (medium effect), and the 
level of significance to 0.05, the power of the observed sample size of 122 was calculated 
to be 0.9078, which was higher than the widely accepted value of 0.80 (Balkin & 
Sheperis, 2011). When running the post hoc power analysis with the effect size of 0.30, 
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observed sample size of 122, and the level of significance at 0.01, the power was 
calculated to 0.8022, which also reached the 0.80 threshold.     
4.2 Data Collection 
By following standard psychometric scale development procedures (Churchill 
1979), a structured survey instrument has been developed after studying other scholarly 
research with similar concepts to this one. This survey instrument contains existing 
measures and customized questions that are relevant to the constructs of this study. A 
two-step process has been implemented in order to enhance the content validity of this 
survey instrument. First, an intensive literature review has been conducted to identify 
valid measurements for the related constructs. Existing measures that have been 
employed in other published studies are adopted as much as possible. Second, the 
preliminary instrument was pre-tested by three managers with extensive experience in 
managing outsourcing projects. Feedback from these reviewers have been incorporated 
into the final version of the survey instrument. Appendix B shows the archetype of the 
survey instrument for this study. As already noted, managers who had direct involvement 
with IT outsourcing engagements were selected as individual participants because they 
represented some of the most knowledgeable people regarding the overall outsourcing 
experience of their organizations (Hambrick, 1981; Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980; Zajac & 
Shortell, 1989).  
Also noted earlier, the data-gathering procedure used email to solicit participation 
in the study from business professionals who were members of the PMI Information 
Systems Community of Practice. The solicitation explained the purpose of the study and 
provided assurances of confidentiality for participants. A few days later, a separate email 
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with the link to the survey instrument was emailed to these executives for completion. If 
the completed questionnaire was not returned after one week, a reminder email was sent. 
After one more week, a second reminder was sent to the subjects who had not yet 
returned their questionnaires. A week later, the third reminder was sent to those who still 
had not yet completed their survey. If the questionnaire was not returned four weeks after 
it was sent, the participant was considered a non-respondent. 
In this study, managers were distributed a survey instrument designed to measure 
the outsourcing experience of the organization, as well as the governance mechanisms 
that are employed by the firm. The raw survey data was captured and stored in the 
database of the company that hosted the survey. 
4.3 Variables 
4.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is the IT managers’ perceptions of 
outsourcing success. This variable is operationalized as a continuous variable that was 
based on the results obtained from the nine-question survey instrument created by Grover 
et al. (1996). See Table I for the Dimensions and Items of Outsourcing Success.   
The survey instrument was based on questions where higher scores indicated that 
the subject agreed more with the statements that expressed higher measurements for 
outsourcing success. With the seven-point Likert scale used in the survey, the lowest 
obtainable score would be one (meaning that the respondents selected “strongly disagree” 
for all nine questions) and the highest obtainable score would be seven (meaning that the 
respondent selected “strongly agree” for all nine questions).The responses to the nine 
questions from Grover et al.’s instrument were added and averaged in order to provide an 
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overall measurement of the outsourcing success of the organization. The higher the 
observed average score the organization received, the higher was the outsourcing success 
that the organization indicated.  
Table I. Dimensions and Items of Outsourcing Success  
(from Grover, Cheon, and Tang, 1996). 
Dimension of 
Outsourcing Success 
Item 
(Strongly disagree, Strongly agree, 7 anchors) 
Strategic benefits  We have been able to refocus on core business 
 We have enhanced our IT competence 
Technical benefits  We have increased access to key information technologies 
 We have reduced the risk of technological obsolescence 
Economic benefits  We have enhanced economies of scale in human resources 
 We have increased access to skilled personnel 
 We have enhanced economies of scale in technological resources 
 We have increased control of IT expenses 
Overall satisfaction  We are satisfied with our overall benefits from outsourcing 
  
 
As previously explained, outsourcing success has been evaluated by other scholars 
through single-item measures such as satisfaction (Kim & Chung, 2003; Rouse & Corbitt, 
2003), cost saving (Karpathiou & Tanner, 1995; Lacity & Willcocks, 2001; Saunder, 
Gebelt, & Hu, 1997), and vendor performance (Kern, 1999). However, a study done by 
Grover, Cheon, and Teng (1996) was able to develop and assess a psychometric measure 
of outsourcing success that involves three general types of benefits—strategic, technical, 
and economic. Three years later, Grover et al.’s nine-item instrument of outsourcing 
success was validated by Lee and Kim (1999), and Lee (2001), and was adopted by other 
scholars such as Han et al. (2008) and Wang (2002). (Validity refers to the degree to 
which an observed result of an instrument can be relied upon and not attributed to 
random error within a sample. An independently validated instrument provides further 
confidence that the results observed are indeed reflecting what the instrument is supposed 
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to measure.)  Content validity of the survey instrument previously was established 
through the adoption of validated instruments by other researchers in the literature and by 
the simple pretest conducted herein using three IT managers from different corporations.  
To examine the internal consistency of measuring outsourcing success with the 
Grover et al. (1996) instrument, Lee (2001) calculated Cronbach's alpha to validate the 
reliability of the instrument. (Cronbach’s alpha is a coefficient of reliability and can have 
any value less than or equal to 1. A higher Cronbach’s alpha signifies higher reliability, 
which is more desirable.) After evaluating 223 responses, the Cronbach’s alpha for 
outsourcing success was calculated to 0.903 from the Lee (2001) study. Han et al. (2008) 
also reported a 0.928 reliability level for the outsourcing success items. In addition, Lee 
(2001) examined convergent validity (which refers to the degree to which multiple 
attempts to measure the same concept are in agreement) by evaluating the correlation of 
each item to the sum of the remaining items, this study found that all of the correlations 
are significant at the 0.001 level and in the range of 0.582 and 0.720 (Lee, 2001).   
4.3.2 Independent Variables 
 
The independent variables in this study include both a formal contract mechanism 
(financial commitment in the form of asset-specifity), and informal contract mechanisms 
(calculative trust, attitudinal commitment, and future business relationship), as well as 
technological capabilities of the company. Each of these will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs.   
Financial Commitment.  A three-item measure developed by Tian, Lai, and 
Daniel (2008) was used to capture the amount of financial commitment that customers 
receive from their vendors. Tian et al. (2008) adapted this measure from Corsten and 
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Kumar (2005) to identify a vendor’s willingness to dedicate relationship-specific 
physical, process, and human assets sufficient to meet the current and long-term needs of 
its logistics outsourcing customer. The construct reliability was accessed using the 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. The Cronbach’s alpha for this particular construct was 
0.805, which was higher than the 0.700 threshold that was commonly being used as 
acceptable reliability by other scholars (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). The Tian et al. 
(2008) study also examined item reliability by means of factor loadings of the construct 
items. With the factor loadings in the range of 0.832 and 0.841, these items were 
confirmed to have adequate item reliability because their loadings were higher than 
0.700, which was accepted as having sufficient item reliability (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
The same measure was customized to meet the context of this study and was used to 
gauge relationship-specific investment from outsourcing service providers.  
Calculative Trust.  To measure calculative trust, this study used three items from 
the N’Goala (2010) study that investigated long-term relationships between corporations 
and their customers. Convergent validity of the three items that were used to measure this 
construct was established because the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) was greater 
than 0.50, which meant the variance of each construct was better explained by its 
measures than by error (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). In addition, the N’Goala (2010) 
study also used the Root AVE index to examine the discriminant validity of its survey 
instrument. Its result showed that the Root AVE index of each construct was higher than 
any other correlation with other latent variables, which confirmed discriminant validity 
(N’Goala, 2010).   
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Commitment.  The survey instrument in Han et al. (2008) contained four items 
that measure commitment. The Cronbach’s alpha for these measurements was 0.890, 
which was higher than the 0.700 threshold. The AVE of this construct was 0.669, which 
also was higher than the commonly accepted 0.500 threshold (Han et al., 2008). In 
addition, Han et al. (2008) assessed discriminant validity by examining the square root of 
AVE, and reported that the square root of AVE for each construct was greater than the 
correlations between all other constructs.  
Future Business Relationship.  A 4-item measures used in the Carson, Madhok, 
and Wu (2006) was being employed in this study. By using LISREL VII, the goodness-
of-fit index (GFI), as well as Bentler and Bonett's (1980) delta statics all indicate 
acceptable fit. Carson, Madhok and Wu (2006) also reported that reliability was 
measured to 0.81, which exceeded the 0.60 guideline as suggested by Bagozzi and Yi 
(1988). 
Technological Capability.  The survey instrument in Han et al. (2008) contained 
three items that measure internal technological capability in terms of ability to integrate 
IT and the ability to understand the trend of IT. The Cronbach’s alpha for the Han et al. 
(2008) measurements was 0.902, which was higher than the 0.700 threshold. The AVE of 
this construct was 0.570, which also was higher than the commonly accepted 0.500 
threshold (Han et al., 2008). The square root of AVE for this construct was greater than 
the correlations between all other constructs as well. All survey instruments for financial 
commitment, calculative trust, attitudinal commitment, and technological capability are 
included in Appendix B, Survey Instruments.   
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4.3.3 Control Variables 
This study included industry and managers’ outsourcing experience as control 
variables in the analysis. Industry, measured by using the breakdown according to the 
U.S. Census, might affect managers’ perception on the IT outsourcing success because 
some industries have a longer history in IT outsourcing than others (Adelakun, 2004). 
Recently, Volek (2012) reported an outsourcing maturity curve in 2011 that showed that 
the insurance industry and the banking industry were both advanced in outsourcing 
maturity when compared with other industries such as healthcare, and life sciences. This 
finding echoed Ang and Straub (1998), who stated that the banking industry was an 
industry with a long history of IT outsourcing. Following those breakdowns from the US 
Census, the industries were listed as forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support; 
mining; utilities; construction; manufacturing; wholesale trade; retail trade; transportation 
or warehousing; information; finance or insurance; real estate or rental and leasing; 
professional, scientific or technical services; management of companies or enterprises; 
administration, support, waste management or remediation services; educational services; 
health care or social assistance; arts, entertainment or recreation; accommodation or food 
services; other services (except public administration); and unclassified establishments.  
Furthermore, this study also controlled for managers’ outsourcing experience 
using the three-item measures from Ho, Ang, and Straub (2003), which asked its 
respondents to evaluate how well their service providers delivered what they promised in 
terms of: meeting their deadlines; conducting key activities, such as application 
development, software maintenance, or infrastructure support; and fulfilling their overall 
obligations as stated in their Service Level Agreements (Ho et al., 2003). These questions 
were used in this study to measures managers’ overall outsourcing experiences from their 
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previous engagements. Research found that manager’s previous experience impacted 
their perception of similar events in the future (Wang, 2010). After studying athletes’ 
perceived susceptibility to sports-related injury, Stephan, Deroche, Brewer, Caudroit, and 
Le Scanff (2009) concluded that previous experience did impact athletes’ perception at a 
later time. It stated that previous experience led people to believe that "if it happened in 
the past, it can happen again" (Stephan et al., 2009, p.681). Cowley (2007) also reported 
that consumers used previous experience as a proxy for their liking of later experiences. 
It further stated that consumers were not consciously aware of the interfering effect of 
previous experience and they did not realize their reliance on previous experience when 
constructing memory (Cowley, 2007). This study thus controlled for industry and 
managers’ outsourcing experience in order to extract possible confounding effects from 
these variables.      
4.3.4 Profile Variables 
The research instrument for this study also contains several profile variables to 
capture relevant information from the subject. Following Schwarz, Hirschheim, 
Jayatilaka, and Goles (2009), the job title breakdown used in this study are manager, 
director, EVP/vice President, CIO, CTO, COO, CEO, and others.  
Appendix C provides detail reliability and validity information for all variables of 
interest in this study,    
4.4 Hypotheses Testing 
The hypotheses for this study are: 
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H1: Financial commitment in the form of dedicated asset-specific investments by 
both the outsourcer and the outsourcee is positively related to managerial 
perceptions of IT outsourcing success.  
H2: Calculative trust is positively related to managerial perception of IT 
outsourcing success. 
H3: Attitudinal commitment is positively related to managerial perception of IT 
outsourcing success. 
H4: Relational contracts in the form of continuing possible future business 
relationships are positively related to managerial perceptions of IT outsourcing 
success.  
H5a: A firm’s technological capabilities moderates the relationship between 
asset-specific investments and managerial perception of IT outsourcing success.  
H5b: A firm’s technological capabilities moderates the relationship between 
calculative trust and managerial perception of IT outsourcing success.  
H5c: A firm’s technological capabilities moderates the relationship between 
attitudinal commitment and managerial perception of IT outsourcing success.  
 Multiple regression analyses were used to examine managerial perceptions of 
outsourcing success with asset-specific commitment, future business relationship, 
calculative trust, and attitudinal commitment. Multiple linear regression is a commonly 
used method for exploratory data analysis (Craven & Stamper, 1972; Wheatley & Chiu, 
1977). Through reviewing statistical means, this exploratory technique identifies the best 
sub-set of independent variables from the overall set to include in a model (McIntyre, 
Montgomery, Srinivasan, & Weitz, 1983). The relationship between the variables was 
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assessed by examining the parameter estimate of each independent variable that was 
included in the model. If the parameter estimate was found to be significant, this would 
indicate that the independent variable did have an impact on the dependent variable 
(Moore & McCabe, 2006), which in turn signified there was a positive or negative 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables of the model.  
In order to determine whether the parameter estimate was significantly different 
from zero, an F-test is implemented on the parameter estimate. If the resulting test 
statistic is found to exceed the critical value, then one would be able to conclude that the 
independent variable is significantly related to the dependent variable. On the other hand, 
if the resulting test statistic is not greater than the critical value, it would be considered to 
be not significant (Mendenhall, Beaver, & Beaver, 1999). The critical value for the test 
statistic in a linear regression model is determined by the level of significance and the 
degrees of freedom for the given model.  In general, the level of significance is 0.05 
while the degrees of freedom for a regression model would be n – 2, where n is the 
number of observations in the dataset (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). This test would allow 
the researcher to determine whether the relationship was significant and to determine the 
direction of the relationship. 
To be able to address the direct relationship between each independent variable 
and the dependent variable of this study, the following model was used: 
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Ŷ = c+ X1β1 + X2β2 + X3β3 + X4β4 + e      
where  
Ŷ =  outsourcing success,  
c  =  constant,  
X1  =  financial commitment in the form of dedicated asset-specific investments, 
β1  =  parameter estimate for the asset-specific investments, 
X2  =  calculative trust,  
β2  =  parameter estimate for the calculative trust, 
X3  =  attitudinal commitment,  
β3  =  parameter estimate for the attitudinal commitment, 
X4  =  relational contracts in the form of possible future business relationship,  
β4  =  parameter estimate for the possible future business relationship, and 
e  =  random error term with a mean of zero and a common variance σ2  
  (Keuhl, 2000).  
 
The significance of the independent variable would be indicated in the estimate β. 
If there was a significant positive coefficient, then this would indicate that as the scores 
for the independent variables increase, the perception of a successful IT outsourcing 
endeavor would also increase. Alternatively, if there was a significant negative 
coefficient, then this would indicate that as the investment of the independent variables 
increases, the perception of a successful IT outsourcing effort would gradually be 
reduced. By using the linear regression model, the researcher would be able to determine 
the perceived impact of using asset-specific investments, calculative trust, and attitudinal 
commitment on managers’ perception on the success of IT outsourcing. This statistic 
procedure was used to test hypothesis 1, 2, 3, and 4 because these hypotheses are 
concerned with relationships between a dependent variable that was continuous and 
independent variables that were continuous.  
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For the remaining hypotheses 5a, 5b, and 5c, a statistical method used by Baron 
and Kenny (1986) was used to assess the moderator effects of other independent 
variables. In this method, the test for the moderator effect is to perform an analysis 
similar to that of a multiple regression model. The idea behind this method was to find 
out whether there is a significant interaction between the variables within the study 
(Barron & Kenny, 1986). For hypotheses 5a, 5b, and 5c, the independent variables of 
interest were the asset-specific investment, calculative trust, and attitudinal commitment. 
The dependent variable was the perceived outsourcing success of the organization. In 
order to determine whether internal technological capabilities provided a moderating 
effect on the execution of the governance mechanism, the interactions between internal 
technological capabilities and each of the three independent variables were included in 
the model.  
The model that is used for this assessment is: 
Ŷ = c + X1β1 + X2β2 + X3β3 + X4β4 + X1X5β5 + X2X5β6 + X3X5β7 + e      
where  
Ŷ  =  outsourcing success,  
c  =  constant for this model,  
X1  =  financial commitment in the form of asset-specific investments,  
β1  = parameter estimate for the asset-specific investments,  
X2  =  calculative trust,  
β2  =  parameter estimate for the calculative trust, 
X3  =  attitudinal commitment,  
β3  =  parameter estimate for the attitudinal commitment, 
X4  =  relational contracts in the form of possible future business relationship,  
β4  =  parameter estimate for the possible future business relationship,  
X5  =  buyer’s internal technological capabilities,  
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X1X5  =  interaction of the asset-specific investments and the buyer’s internal 
technological capabilities,  
 
β5  =  parameter estimate for the interaction between the asset-specific 
investments and the buyer’s internal technological capabilities,  
 
X2 X5 = interaction between calculative trust and the buyer’s internal 
technological capabilities, 
 
β6  =  parameter estimate for the interaction between the calculative trust and the 
buyer’s internal technological capabilities,  
 
X3 X5  = interaction between attitudinal commitment and the buyer’s internal 
technological capabilities, 
 
β7  =  parameter estimate for the interaction between the attitudinal commitment 
and the buyer’s internal technological capabilities, and 
 
e  =  random error term with a mean of zero and a common variance σ2. Based 
on the results of this final model, hypotheses 5a, 5b, and 5c were analyzed. 
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CHAPTER V 
Empirical Results 
 
 
5.1 Results 
 
As Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff (2003) discussed in depth, the use 
of subjective and retrospective self-report measures can raise a concern of having 
common method bias in the collected data. Although collecting self reported data from a 
single source at one time might yield unwanted correlations among data, conducting 
survey using managers who had managed IT outsourcing projects was the only way to 
gather relevant data for this study, such as manager’s perception of IT outsourcing 
success. As stated by Parkhe (1993), conducting same source self reported measures may 
be inevitable in some context. Furthermore, Lance, Dawson, Birkelbach, and Hoffman 
(2010) reported that although common method variance did show an inflationary effect 
on observed relationships, this effect was “almost completely offset by the attenuating 
effect of measurement error” (p. 435). The Harman single-factor test (1967) argued that if 
a substantial amount of common method variance exists, a single factor that accounts for 
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most of the variance will emerge from the factor analysis when all of the variables are 
entered together.  
After forcing observed data into a single factor, results from the principal 
component analysis shown in Table II indicated that this single factor only accounted for 
35.023% of the variance. This signified that there was not a substantial amount of 
common method variance present (Goo, Huang, & Hart, 2008). In order to ease the 
concern of the common data source issue, testing for interaction effects of the constructs 
was employed in this study, per Evans (1985). 
Table II: Results of the Harman’s single-factor analysis. 
 Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component Total Variance % Cumulative 
% 
Total Variance 
% 
Cumulative 
% 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
10.157 
3.370 
2.597 
1.742 
1.576 
1.514 
1.199 
.949 
.644 
.624 
.575 
.471 
.426 
.404 
.324 
.296 
.265 
.253 
.235 
.215 
.197 
.181 
.168 
.132 
.122 
35.023 
11.621 
8.955 
6.008 
5.436 
5.221 
4.133 
3.274 
2.222 
2.152 
1.983 
1.623 
1.470 
1.394 
1.118 
1.021 
.913 
.872 
.809 
.740 
.681 
.624 
.578 
.455 
.420 
35.023 
46.645 
55.600 
61.607 
67.043 
72.264 
76.397 
79.671 
81.893 
84.045 
86.028 
87.651 
89.121 
90.515 
91.633 
92.654 
93.567 
94.438 
95.248 
95.988 
96.668 
97.292 
97.870 
98.325 
98.745 
10.157 35.023 35.023 
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 Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component Total Variance % Cumulative 
% 
Total Variance 
% 
Cumulative 
% 
26 
27 
28 
29 
.117 
.093 
.080 
.073 
.404 
.322 
.277 
.252 
99.149 
99.471 
99.748 
100.000 
Item validity was assessed by conducting principal component analysis with 
varimax rotation. This technique was chosen because it allowed for interpretation of 
relevant factors and the varimax rotation was also the most used rotation technique in 
research (Norusis, 1993). Similar to the majority of researchers reported in Costello and 
Osborne (2005), the Kaiser criterion (all factors with Eigenvalues greater than one) was 
used to decide the number of factors to be retained for rotation. Table III provides the 
results after suppressing the absolute value of the factor loading coefficient below 0.30, 
which was considered to be having a small effect. The results generated seven 
components with minimal cross loading for most measures.  
Table III. Results of Principal Component Analysis for All Variables 
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization 
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Because measures for outsourcing success had moderate cross loading on a 
second component, a separate principal component analysis was conducted with just 
these nine measures to confirm the number of components generated from these 
measures. As shown in Table IV, a single component emerged from the measures for 
outsourcing success. 
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Table IV: Results of Principal Component Analysis for Outsourcing Success 
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization 
 
Outsourcing 
Success 
Single 
Component 
OS-1 
OS-2 
OS-3 
OS-4 
OS-5 
OS-6 
OS-7 
OS-8 
OS-9 
.598 
.806 
.832 
.760 
.858 
.826 
.794 
.841 
.781 
 
In order to evaluate convergent validity, the average variance extracted (AVE) 
was calculated for each of the measures. As shown in Table V, the AVE measurement 
values ranged from 0.5412 to 0.7259 while the commonly accepted threshold for 
acceptable convergent validity is 0.5 (Han et al., 2008). This confirmed that the variance 
of each construct was better explained by its measures than by error (Fornell & Larcher, 
1981). Lastly, discriminant validity was assessed by examining the square root of the 
AVE. The square root of the AVE for each construct as shown in Table V was greater 
than the correlations between all other constructs, which confirmed the discriminant 
validity of these measures.  
Table V: Results of Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and Root AVE 
 
Variable AVE Root AVE 
Asset-specific investments 
Calculative trust 
Attitudinal commitment 
Future business 
Manager experience 
Technological capabilities 
Outsourcing success 
0.5412 
0.6710 
0.6111 
0.5451 
0.6677 
0.7259 
0.6270 
0.7356 
0.8191 
0.7817 
0.7383 
0.8171 
0.8520 
0.7918 
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The 841 members in the Information System Community of Practice in the 
Project Management Institute were sampled for this study. As mentioned in Poppo and 
Zenger (2002), response rates among IT executives usually are low. The 148 responses 
received for this study represents a 17.60% response rate. Out of the 148 responses, 34 of 
them were reported by service providers. Because this study was focused on management 
from the outsourcing companies’ point of view, those responses from service providers 
were not included in further analysis. Furthermore, because one of the responses did not 
report whether it was from a customer or a service provider, it also was removed from 
further analysis. In order to gather a more useful data set, this survey instrument was 
purposely designed to allow respondents to provide input for up to three separate IT 
outsourcing engagements. From all the responses, ten respondents provided data for their 
second IT outsourcing project. However, because three of them were from service 
providers, these three were not included in the final analysis either. Lastly, two other 
respondents also provided data for their third IT outsourcing engagements. Therefore, the 
additional effort of setting up the survey to gather information for more than one set of 
data yielded nine more useful data sets for the final analysis. This addition was 
significant when considering the initial count of 113 questionnaires received from 
managers who purchased outsourced services. The final result set contains 122 completed 
questionnaires, which was higher than the required sample size of 64 that was calculated 
in the ‘a priori’ power analysis as started in the previous section. 
The data collection yielded a heterogeneous sample covering a broad range of 
industries and revealed no indication of systematic bias (Bode, Wagner, Petersen, & 
Ellram, 2011). Table VI provides a detailed industry breakdown of the sample. Most of 
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the respondents were managers with extensive IT outsourcing experience. On average, 
the managers had 8.50 years (s.d. = 4.565) of IT outsourcing experience and had 
managed on average 6.84 (s.d. = 6.184) IT outsourcing projects. In addition, 53.3 percent 
of these individuals were in their current positions for at least 6 years.  
Table VI: Industry Breakdown 
 
Industry Frequency Percentage 
Manufacturing 24 19.8 
Professional, scientific or technical services 20 16.5 
Finance or insurance 16 13.2 
Health care or social assistance 14 11.6 
Information 8 6.6 
Transportaton or warehousing 6 5.0 
Educational services 6 5.0 
Utilities 5 4.1 
Retail trade 4 3.3 
Construction 3 2.5 
Arts, entertainment or recreation 3 2.5 
Mining 2 1.7 
Management of companies or enterprises 2 1.7 
Accommodation or food services 1 0.8 
Others 7 5.8 
 
Missing data often occurs in survey studies. This study also observed records with 
missing data. A separate variance t test was conducted to identify variables with patterns 
of missing values, which may be influencing this study. The results of this test showed 
only six questions that had missing values and all six questions were related to internal 
technological capability. Review of the dataset indicated that three questionnaires had 
missing data in all six questions, while all other questions in these questionnaires had 
data in them. This observation led to a belief that this missing data might have been 
caused by computer error. The survey instrument was delivered to test subjects on-line 
through web browsers. Questions representing each hypothesis were showing in different 
web pages. After respondents finished answering one set of questions, they would need to 
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click the Next button to forward to the next set of questions. It could be a computer-
related issue that caused the page containing questions related to internal technological 
capability to not display to these users. Therefore, this missing data can be seen as 
missing completely in random. While few statistically valid approaches exist in handling 
missing data, the list-wise deletion approach to omit those cases with missing data and to 
compute analyses on what remains is the most commonly used technique (Howell, 2009). 
This study also employed the list-wise deletion approach when analyzing its data.  
In addition to missing data, this study also took extra steps to estimate for 
nonresponsive bias, which has been a concern of researchers who conduct questionnaire 
survey since 1838 (Lambert & Harrington, 1990). Nonresponse bias refers to the 
prejudice differences between the answers from respondents to a survey and the answers 
that researchers might have received from those who did not respond in terms of 
demographic or attitudinal variables (Sax, Gilmartin, & Bryant, 2003). Groves & 
Peytcheva (2008) further explained that nonresponse bias is “a function of whether the 
likelihood of survey participation is related to the variable underlying the estimate” (p. 
169). Within a single survey, some estimates can be subject to large nonresponse biases, 
while others can be subject to negligible biases. As Lambert and Harrington (2006) 
stated, the “larger the bias, the more caution the researcher should exercise in 
generalizing results of the respondent sample to the entire population” (p. 6). While 
scholars have introduced a number of methods for estimating nonrepsonse bias, 
extrapolations are considered to be those that lead to better outcomes (Armstrong & 
Overton, 1977).  
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To identify whether significant bias exists in this study, time trends extrapolation 
were conducted. Responses from early-returned questionnaires and late-returned 
questionnaires on a number of variables: industry, dedicated asset-specific investments, 
future business relationship, calculative trust, attitudinal commitment, technical 
capabilities, and managerial perception of outsourcing success, were compared. This 
procedure was recommended by Armstrong and Overton (1997) and was adopted by 
many scholars, such as Guthrie (2001), and Poppo and Zenger (2002). The assumption of 
this analysis is that late respondents share similar characteristics and response biases as 
nonrespondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1997; Guthrie, 2001). Analyses as shown in 
Table VII indicate that there no significant mean differences existed between early and 
late respondents.  
Table VII: Comparison between Early Responders and Late Responses. 
Variables Early Responses Late Responses 
Dedicated asset-specific investments 4.1167 4.2022 
Future business relationship 4.4057 4.4057 
Calculative trust 3.9781 3.5738 
Attitudinal commitment 5.4959 5.5164 
Technological capabilities 5.0000 4.9836 
Managerial perception of outsourcing success 4.8725 5.0333 
 
Table VIII presents the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations 
among independent variables. While results show that there was some correlation among 
these variables, the magnitude of the observed correlations suggested that these variables 
were not simply redundant measures, (i.e., the correlations range from 0.018 to 0.520 and 
thus provide evidence of discriminant validity). There was moderate correlation between 
dedicated asset-specific investments and possible future business. This indicated a higher 
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tendency of partners investing financially into their relationship when there was a higher 
possibility of future business prospects. Following procedures conducted by Tian et al. 
(2008), discriminant validity was further assessed by examining the 95 percent 
confidence intervals around all possible pair-wise construct correlations. Results showed 
that the construct correlations range in value from 0.002 to 0.690. Because none of the 
confidence intervals encompass 1.0; it suggested discriminant validity among the 
constructs (Anderson, 1987).  
Table VIII: Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to the correlation between variables, multicollinearity is another 
concern that researchers often assess. Multicollinearity occurs when there are high 
correlations among the latent exogenous constructs (Grewal, Cote, & Baumgartner, 
2004), which can provide redundant information about the response. High 
multicollinearity can reduce reliability of the tested model (Blalock, 1963) and can cause 
misleading results. For this study, variance inflation factors (VIF) were calculated for 
each predictor. The result showed that VIFs were in the range of 1.169 and 2.644. 
Because none of the values were higher than or equal to 10, which was the most 
commonly used rule of thumb as a sign of severe or serious multicollinearity (O'Brien, 
2007), it was concluded that there was no multicollinearity among these independent 
variables.  
Variable Means s.d. AI CT AC FB TC OS 
Asset-specific investments (AI) 4.159 1.588 1.000      
Calculative trust (CT) 3.776 1.481 .418**      
Attitudinal Commitment (AC) 5.506 1.145 .318** .202*     
Future Business (FB) 4.405 1.457 .520** .420** .425**    
Technological capabilities (TC) 4.991 1.140 .095 .018 .271** .192*   
Outsourcing success (OS) 4.952 1.121 .366** .244** .702** .345** .181 1.000 
n=119 – 121, * p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
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To examine the internal consistency of the variables being used in this study, 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were calculated for each of the variables. As stated by 
Reynaldo, J. and Santos A. (1999), Cronbach’s alpha is appropriate for illustrating the 
reliability of factors extracted from both dichotomous and scales variables. A split-half 
analysis by calculating Spearman-Brown Coefficient was also performed. As shown in 
Table IX, the Cronbach’s alpha values ranged from 0.735 to 0.924, with all higher than 
the 0.7 threshold that is commonly considered as acceptable reliability (Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994). This indicated that all six variables do have acceptable reliability.  
Table IX: Internal Consistency Calculation for Dependent 
 and Independent Variables 
 
Variable Cronbach’s alpha Spearman-Brown 
Coefficient 
Outsourcing success 0.924 ELa:0.882 
UL:0.883 
Asset-specific investments 0.735 EL:0.790 
UL:0.805 
Calculative trust 0.835 EL: 0.874 
UL: 0.885 
Attitudinal commitment 0.908 EL: 0.923 
UL: 0.923 
Future business relationship 0.819 EL:0.762 
UL:0.762 
Technological capabilities 0.844 EL: 0.814 
UL: 0.829 
Managers’ outsourcing experience  0.865 EL: 0.912 
UL: 0.921 
Note: EL stands for Equal Length, UL stands for Unequal Length. 
 
5.2 Analysis 
 
Given that previous research has suggested that industries were known to be at 
different maturity levels in terms of IT outsourcing (Adelakun, 2004), this study also 
controlled for industry prior to examining the relationships of interest. Existing literature 
also suggested that previous experience could affect perception of similar events in the 
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future. Therefore, this also controlled managerial outsourcing experience prior to 
examining the relationships of interest in order to extract possible confounding effects. 
This procedure provided a stronger test of the theory developed in this study.  
To examine the moderating effect of technological capabilities on the relationship 
between the asset-specific commitment, calculative trust, and attitudinal commitment, 
and managerial perception of outsourcing success, all independent variables were 
centered before further calculation was conducted. This was done by creating a new 
variable for each of the selected independent variables. The values of these variables 
were calculated by subtracting the original value by its mean. These centered independent 
variables were then multiplied by the moderator variable to create interaction variables. 
Lastly, hierarchical regression was performed to determine a potential moderating effect.  
In the first hierarchical regression model, only the control variables of industry 
sector and managers’ outsourcing experience were included. In the second regression 
model, the independent variables of asset-specific investments, calculative trust, 
attitudinal commitment, and expectation of future business were added to the model. 
Afterward, three sets of interaction variables were added to the third model.  Following 
Baron and Kenny (1986), a “moderator effect can be represented as an interaction 
between a focal independent variable and a factor that specifies the appropriate 
conditions for its operation” (p. 1,174). These interaction variables were the interaction 
between technological capabilities and asset-specific investments, the interaction between 
technological capabilities and calculative trust, and the interaction between technological 
capabilities and attitudinal commitment. This step added the multiplicative product of 
each pair of these variables into the third model in order to find out their impacts to the 
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overall model. The result of this multiple regression is shown in Table X. All effects were 
significant at the p < 0.01 level.  
Table X: Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Moderating Effects 
Predictors of Managerial Perceptions of  
Outsourcing Success Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Control Variables 
Industry 
Managerial experience 
 
-.131a (.451)b 
1.315 (.000) 
 
-.028 (.845) 
.480 (.023) 
 
-.027 (.851) 
.401 (.057) 
Main Effects 
Asset-specific investment (AI) 
Calculative trust (CT)  
Attitudinal commitment (AC) 
Future business (FB) 
Technological Capabilities (TC) 
  
.297 (.082) 
.014 (.935) 
1.224 (.000) 
-.054 (.706) 
-.023 (.911) 
 
.273 (.104) 
.244 (.199) 
1.361 (.000) 
-.134 (.347) 
.056 (.781) 
Moderator Effects 
TC * AI 
TC * CT 
TC * AC 
   
.036 (.411) 
-.064 (.195) 
.108 (.010) 
Predicted Model Results  
F-value 
R2  
Adjusted R2   
∆ Adjusted R2  
 
18.621 
.248 
.235 
.235 
 
17.323 
.529 
.498 
.263 
 
13.634 
.565 
.523 
.025 
Note:  a Unstandardized regression coefficients (β), b p-value 
 
Results showed that all models were statistically significant (p < .001). Model 1 
indicated that control variables explained a portion of the variance (R2 = .248). Model 2 
captured the factors that were hypothesized to have direct impact on managerial 
perception of IT outsourcing performance.  
When independent variables, asset-specific investments, calculative trust, 
attitudinal commitment, and expectation of future business, were included in the model, 
the variance explained increased significantly (∆R2 = .281, p < .001). This study first 
asked whether financial commitment in the form of asset-specific investments is 
positively related to the managerial perception of IT outsourcing success (H1). Following 
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previous research, unstandardized regression estimates were used to evaluate the direct 
relationship between variables (Bode, Wagner, Petersen, & Ellram, 2011). Results 
showed that asset-specific investments did positively affect managerial perception (b = 
 273, p ≤ .01), which provided marginal empirical support for H1.  
Next, the direct effect of calculative trust on managerial perception was analyzed 
(H2). Results as shown in Table X indicate that calculative trust also are positively 
related to managerial perception of outsourcing success (b = .244, p = .199). The 
prediction of calculative trust indicated a direct and positive relationship, and thus, 
managerial perception of outsourcing success is not supported. Attitudinal commitment 
also was hypothesized to be positively related to managerial perception (H3). The results 
showed that attitudinal commitment are positively related to managerial perception of IT 
outsourcing success (b = 1.361, p < 0.001). Thus, the results provided empirical 
supported for H3 as well. Lastly, the forth factor hypothesized to be positively related to 
managerial perception of outsourcing success was the expectation of future business 
relationships (H4). Contrary to the prediction, the results suggested a negative coefficient 
for the expectation of future business (b = -.134). Therefore, the positive relationship 
between expectation of future business and managerial perception of outsourcing success 
was not supported.           
Model 3 introduced the moderator effects of internal technological capabilities. 
The inclusion of the interaction terms explained a small but highly significant additional 
amount of variance (∆R2 = .036, p < .001). This study first addressed the moderator effect 
of internal technological capabilities on the relationship between asset-specific 
investments and managerial perception of outsourcing success (H5a). Results indicated 
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that the internal capabilities and asset-specific investments interaction term was 
significant (b = .036, p = .411). Thus, H5a was not supported. Next, the moderation effect 
of internal technological capabilities on the relationship between calculative trust and 
managerial perception of outsourcing success was evaluated (H5b). The results revealed 
that the interaction effect of internal technological capabilities and calculative trust was 
significant and in the negative direction (b = -.064, p = .195). Therefore, H5b was not 
supported. Finally, the moderation effect of internal technological capabilities on the 
relationship between attitudinal commitment and managerial perception of outsourcing 
success (H5c) was evaluated. Results showed a positive and significant regression 
coefficient for the technological capabilities and attitudinal commitment interaction term 
(b = .108, p = .010). This provided empirical support to the H5c.         
5.3 Discussion 
 
The results of this study provide partial support for the hypotheses regarding the 
directional linkages among the model variables. The data provided strong support for the 
positive relationship between asset-specific investments and managerial perception of 
management success; as well as a positive relationship between attitudinal commitment 
and managerial perception of outsourcing success.  
However, results also showed that the internal technological capabilities were 
moderating the relationship between calculative trust and managerial perception of 
outsourcing success in a negative direction, which contradicted the hypothesis in this 
study. This was surprising, yet some literature also found this artifact. Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) mentioned that when employees shared specialized language, coding 
scheme, or expertise, this technical strength “impedes the incorporation of outside 
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knowledge and results in the pathology of the not-invented-here (NIH) syndrome” 
(p.133). Ridby and Zook (2002) also reported that two out of five executives surveyed 
indicated that their companies suffered from the NIH syndrome (Katz & Allen, 1982). 
This had impacted a company’s willingness to adopt external ideas and knowledge. 
Furthermore, Hansen and Nohria (2004) indicated that the NIH syndrome was one of the 
key barriers to collaboration. When a company had a strong internal technical team, it 
might suffer the same syndrome, and not be open to external ideas or not fully cooperate 
with external service providers (Bettencourt, Ostrom, Brown, & Roundtree, 2002). The 
Relational View also stressed that business partners’ capabilities needed to be 
complementary to each other in order to generate relational rents (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
Simply having higher technological capabilities might not be sufficient to help 
outsourcers better enjoy knowledge sharing among business partners.     
Conflicts between internal and external IT capabilities could diminish the overall 
productivity of organizational IT (Nevo, Wade, & Cook, 2007, p. 6), which in turn 
hindered the impact of an outsourcing project. Dyer and Singh (1998) further specified 
that technological capability was just one of the two important factors that were required 
for enhancing outsourcer’s partner-specific absorptive capability. Outsourcing companies 
also need to develop interaction routines that maximize the frequency and intensity of 
sociotechnical interaction before they can enjoy supernormal relational rents. In addition, 
strong internal technological capabilities might enable companies to step in and complete 
the project internally, in the event that their service providers were not performing as 
expected, or threatening to walk away from a project (Mayer & Saloman, 2006). This 
may impact managerial perceptions negatively regarding the benefits that they receive 
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from their partners. External contractors also might not be able to receive legitimacy if 
their knowledge and expertise did not differ substantially from that possessed by the in-
house IT team (Nevo et al., 2007). Furthermore, companies with strong internal 
technological capabilities may be more likely to outsource functions that are repetitive 
and non-strategic in nature. As suggested by Lacity and Willcocks (2000), one of the key 
benefits of outsourcing is to be able to redirect internal staff to focus on tasks that are 
more strategic in nature. Managers who oversaw IT outsourcing projects that were non-
strategic or less challenging than their internal projects might not value their service 
providers’ contribution as much as if these projects were mission critical. Lastly, because 
non-strategic outsourcing projects would likely not be as visible to upper management as 
other critical initiatives, managers who handled these engagements might not appreciate 
their partners as much. These factors could impact the outsourcing projects negatively 
and might explain the negative moderation impact that the internal technology 
capabilities had on the relationship between the calculative trust and managerial 
perception of outsourcing success.  
Another surprising finding was that the hypothesized positive relationship 
between expected future business and managerial perception of outsourcing success was 
not supported. Basic economics might provide an explanation in this case.  
The most recent global recession has had a tremendous impact on companies 
across the globe. As stated in Gregg and Wadsworth (2010), “the recession of 2008-2009 
inflicted a larger cumulative loss of UK output than any of the other post-war recessions” 
(p.61). While companies were going through their recovery process from this global 
recession that started in 2008 (Sisko, Truffer, Smith, Keehan, Cylus, Poisal, Clemens, & 
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Lizonitz, 2010), managers were having added pressures from constantly shrinking 
budgets and from increasing demands on needing to get their expected rate of return from 
their investments. Recession might also limit business partners’ abilities and willingness 
to invest in relation-specific assets, which is considered as one of the key sources of inter-
organizational competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh, 1998). In addition, a challenging 
economic outlook also could impact contract length negatively, which, according to the 
Relational View, would also reduce partners’ willingness to invest in relation-specific 
assets. Dyer and Singh (1998) stated that alliance partners needed to assess whether or 
not they would be able to recoup the return on investment during the length of the 
contract. Shortened contract duration might not allow sufficient time for cost recovery 
and thus negatively impact such investments in the partnership. Bladen and Morrow 
(2010) also reported that there were "severely diminished levels of engagement and 
loyalty across industries" during the post-recession period. Furthermore, the shrinking 
economy also heightened the competition among service providers (Liu & Nagurney, 
2011). Customers often benefit from increasing vendor rivalry and needs of clients 
(Michell & Fitzgerald, 1997) and thus the once-valued loyalty between customers and 
their outsourcing partners might not be as important at this juncture. Therefore, the 
expectation of possible future business relationship might not contribute to managers’ 
perception of outsourcing success as originally predicted in this study. Instead, Conley 
(2003) reported that success could act as an antecedence of enhanced partnerships. Alford 
(2011) also stated that experience of success increased people’s willingness to take on 
further work. To test for whether manager’s perception of outsourcing success had any 
significant impact to the expectation of future business, a mediator test was performed.   
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Mediation is said to occur when a causal effect of independent variables on an 
outcome is explained by an intervening variable. (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). According to 
Thonis (2011), the conditions that need to be met when proving a mediation effect 
include: (1) the relationship between independent variable(s) and mediator variable is 
significant; (2) the relationship between the mediator variable and dependent variable(s) 
is significant; (3) the relationship between the independent variable(s) and dependent 
variable(s) is significant; and (4) the relationship between the independent variable(s) and 
dependent variables is reduced when the mediator variable is being introduced into the 
equation. After running hierarchical regression procedures in accordance with the Thonis 
(2002) steps, asset-specific investments, calculative trust, attitudinal commitment, and 
technological capabilities were significantly related to the managerial perception of IT 
outsourcing (R2 = .561, p < 0.001), which satisfies condition 1. Results from regressing 
managerial perception of outsourcing success and expected future business showed a 
significant relationship (R2 = .111, p <0.01), which satisfies condition 2. Model 2 in 
Table XI showed that independent variables were significant related to the managerial 
perception of IT outsourcing (R2 = .565, p < 0.001), which satisfies condition 3. Lastly, 
the model 3 in Table XI showed the adjusted R2 of .366 after the mediator variable was 
added to the regression between the independent variables and dependent variable was 
also lower than the prior adjusted R2 of .367. This satisfies condition 4. Because the 
addition of the mediator variable only reduced, instead of fully eliminated, the 
significance of the model, it thus indicated a partial mediation effect. 
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Table XI: Post Hoc Analysis:  Mediated Regression Results for  
Effect of Outsourcing Success 
 
Predictors of Managerial Perception of 
Outsourcing Success Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Control Variables  
Industry 
Managerial experience 
 
-.081a (.485)b 
.352 (.016) 
 
.007 (.939) 
-.169 (.235) 
 
.006 (.953) 
-.143 (.326) 
Main Effects 
Asset-specific investment (AI) 
Calculative Trust (CT) 
Attitudinal commitment (AC) 
Technological Capabilities (TC) 
  
.404 (.000) 
.399 (.002) 
.386 (.002) 
.182 (.186) 
 
-.143 (.000) 
.411 (.001) 
.469 (.002) 
.184 (.182) 
Moderator Effects 
TC * AI 
TC * CT 
TC * AC 
  
.014 (.649) 
-.043 (.198) 
.045 (.107) 
 
.016 (.599) 
-.047 (-.166) 
.052 (.075) 
Mediator from Post Hoc Analysis  
Outsourcing success 
F-value 
R2  
Adjusted R2   
∆ Adjusted R2  
 
 
3.149 
.053 
.036 
.036 
 
 
8.398 
.416 
.367 
.331 
 
-.063 (.347) 
7.639 
.421 
.366 
-.001 
a Unstandardized regression coefficients (β), b p-value 
Because outsourcing success acted as a partial mediator on future business, a new model based 
on the finding was created (see Figure 2).   
 
Figure 2: Post Hoc Model with Outsourcing Success Mediating  
Future Business Relationships. 
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The findings of this study indicate that the dedicated asset-specific investments, 
calculative trust, and attitudinal trust are positively related to managerial perceptions of 
of outsourcing success. This further strengthens the observation that formal and informal 
governance mechanisms do work in concert during IT outsourcing engagements (Poppo 
& Zenger, 2002 TCE. This study contributes to previous research in that it highlights the 
complementary explanation power that TCE and the RBV bring together in the arena of 
IT outsourcing. In addition, the results of this study also contribute to the literature by 
identifying specific types of trust that have higher correlation to managers’ perception of 
outsourcing success, which have mixed findings in past research.  
The partial mediating effect of outsourcing success on future business indicates 
that, from a practitioner perspective, service providers who are interested in future client 
relationships should ensure that their performance impacts managerial perceptions of 
success because higher perception could lead to future business.  
Furthermore, out of the few key governance mechanisms that this study has 
examined, attitudinal commitment is the most important contributor to the outsourcing 
success. This is consistent with observations by other studies, such as Ahmed and Salas 
(2009) that stated that there is substantial evidence that in-group feelings have a 
significant effect on individual behavior. This study contributes to practice by 
highlighting the interconnectedness of governance mechanisms and outsourcing success. 
An implication for practice is that purchasing companies should devote attention in 
building trusting relationships and creating an environment to promote win-win situation 
for both parties, particularly when faced with difficult financial turbulence. As suggested 
in Obadia (2010), purchasing companies should communicate intensively about their 
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actions to promote trust and long-term relationships in order to build up perceptions of 
commitment from their partners. These perceptions will then in turn enhance the business 
relationship among both parties and will benefit the outsourcing project in the end. 
Lastly, the confirmed moderation effects that internal technological capabilities possess 
also encourage outsourcing companies to continue devote sufficient resources to maintain 
or even build up their own IT departments, while engaging their service providers to 
handle some of their IT functions.    
5.4 Limitations and Areas for Future Research 
 
Several limitations of this study should be noted. First, because this study 
gathered self-reported data from a single source at one time, common method variance 
due to single-source bias could be a concern and might have inflated the magnitude of the 
relationships found. Second, the relatively small datasets used for this study may limit the 
ability to generalize its findings. Third, this study only focused on the managers from the 
receiving end; future studies should investigate from the service providers’ point of view 
to find out whether similar effects would be observed. Fourth, because no objective data 
on each company’s outsourcing outcome was collected, it was not certain how well 
managers’ perceptions align with their companies’ financial results. A comparative study 
of managerial perception and financial impact is suggested.  
Furthermore, Ahmed and Salas (2009) also suggested that trust and its impact 
differs across cultures. As reported by TPI, a global IT sourcing advisory firm that tracks 
larger IT deals worldwide, the IT outsourcing market in the United States only accounted 
for 32.5% of the total $95 billion global contract values in 2011 (Maitra, 2012). During 
that year, the EMEA market jumped 27 percent to $55.30 billion while the American 
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continent market, on the other hand, contracted 20 percent to $31 billion (Maitra, 2012). 
This shifting dynamic further highlights the important of studying this subject in 
countries other than the United States to determine whether cultural differences will have 
any significant impact to the governance mechanisms and the managers’ perception of 
outsourcing success.  
While IT is one of the key business functions that corporations have been 
outsourcing to service providers, companies have been outsourcing business functions 
such as engineering (Zirpoli & Becker, 2011), manufacturing (Bardhan & Kroll, 2003), 
and R&D (Mol, 2005), to other business partners as well. R&D-intensive industries 
traditionally have been seen as an impediment to outsourcing because these industries 
usually have sufficient scale advantages to allow for vertical integration (Harrigan, 1985), 
and the proprietary nature of R&D has increased the risk of opportunities (Williamson, 
1985).  However, the Relational View provided a contradictory viewpoint and suggested 
that outsourcing should become more and more favorable in the context of R&D-
intensive firms (Mol, 2005). According to the Relational View, the complementary inter-
sector technological specialization will provide mutual benefits to both outsourcers and 
vendors (Dyer & Singh, 1998). The increasing popular use of self-enforcement 
governance mechanisms also promotes effective exchanges of technological know-how 
among the outsourcing partners (Barthelemy, 2003). After empirically testing the 3-digit 
level census data of Statistics Netherlands on 52 industries, Mol (1995) concluded that 
"the relational view appears to be an appropriate portrait of empirical reality as it has 
been developing" (p. 593). Scholars should look into the impact of governance 
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mechanisms to the managers’ perception of outsourcing success in these transactions, as 
well.  
Lastly, the finding of this study indicate that managerial years of experience in IT 
outsourcing had a significant effect on the impact of governance mechanism to 
managerial perception of outsourcing success. Instead of looking at experience at the 
individual level, Littlepage, Robison, and Reddington (1997) indicated that group 
experience could also increase performance by facilitating recognition and utilization of 
member expertise. Future studies should investigate the effect of experience from the 
corporation level to find out whether that has even bigger impact than experience of 
individual manager.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
OUTSOURCING TYPES 
 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the following paragraphs describe the types of 
outsourcing arrangements. 
Body shopping refers to a common practice in which companies bring in 
supplemental laborers from temporary employment agencies, such as Manpower, Inc., to 
help take care of daily IT operations (Mastakar & Bowonder, 2005; Pattnaik, 2005).  
While the U.S. economy is still improving, following its downturn in 2002 and again in 
2008, many companies have opted for this approach to minimize the long-term 
commitment in human resources expenditures. This practice also is what Lacity et al. 
(1996) have referred to as one example of insourcing, in which companies bring in 
external staff and resources and manage them under in-house administration.  Although 
temporary workers are not employees of the purchasing companies, they do take job 
assignments directly from the purchasing company’s management.  This approach allows 
companies to retain control because they manage the assets, including labor power, 
required to do the work (Brooks, 2006).  
Body shopping often is used when companies possess sufficient internal skills to 
manage those supplemental staff and monitor the work that they do.  However, when it is 
time to handle new initiatives for which companies lack internal expertise or they want to 
preserve their internal staff for executing other tasks, companies can choose to engage 
service providers in short-term consulting projects. These projects involve requesting 
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their service providers to perform some clearly defined IT-related activities that will be 
completed in one year or less (Cartus, 2010).    
Short-term consulting refers to the practice of bringing in teams of professionals 
on occasion to supplement staff shortages or skill gaps in order to complete some 
predefined projects or assignments, such as application development or implementing a 
new accounting system (Meyskens et al., 2009).  The time duration for this type of 
engagement is usually less than one year (Cartus, 2010; Petrovic, Harris & Brewster, 
2000). In order to bring in fresh ideas, supplement skill gaps, and shorten time to 
delivery, companies may outsource the design, development, or testing to outside 
consultants. Typical projects in this area are designing and developing web sites for 
internal employees or external customers and business partners and customizing business 
applications (Meyskens et al., 2009). While short-term outsourcing engagements are 
projects that can be defined clearly, evaluated, and completed within one year or less 
(Petrovic et al. 2000), those projects that are more extensive in scope or have greater time 
commitments can be termed as either selective outsourcing or comprehensive outsourcing 
(Lacity et al., 1996).   
Selective outsourcing is “the practice of outsourcing select IT applications to 
vendors while retaining other IT applications in-house” (Lacity et al., 1996, p. 14).  By 
using this delivery model, selected IT functions, accounting for between 20–80% of the 
IT budget, are being outsourced to external providers.  Lacity and Willcocks (1998) 
found that firms predominantly engage in selective outsourcing and are able to realize 
greater cost savings than those that use short-term consulting engagements or 
comprehensive levels of outsourcing. It should be noted that while the cost savings are 
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better for selective outsourcing, lower costs resulting in increased efficiency may not 
result in an increase in effectiveness. This dissertation differs from previous literature in 
that it is designed to consider both costs and other associated benefits or detriments.  
In selective outsourcing, the company signs a single contract with an external 
service provider for the provision of all operations within a category of services, such as 
the entire helpdesk support function (Cohen & Young, 2006).  Commodity functions, 
such as e-mail filtering, data centers, and disaster management, are also good candidates 
for using this approach (Gibson, 2006). Transaction-intensive processes that are high in 
volume, but add minimal value to the company, lend themselves to outsourcing as well 
(Beulen, Baas, Dain, Hudson, Reitsma, Symonds, & Van Der Zee, 2004). One example 
of such a process is payroll processing (Gibson, 2006). Furthermore, selective 
outsourcing also is a preferred option for Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) contracts 
when significant asset transfer and complex integrated processes are involved (Tyler, 
2004).  
Depending on the nature of services rendered, delivery models do vary (Gibson, 
2006). They can be performed onsite, offsite (which could mean internationally), or a 
combination of both (Beulen et al., 2004). For example, while an IT helpdesk call center 
likely is to be operated offsite and increasingly operate offshore where costs are often 
lower, desk-side IT support usually is handled onsite (Beulen et al., 2004). This option 
provides the benefits of accessing technical skills, enjoying economies of scale, and 
requiring less complex project management when compared to using multiple vendors.  
However, because the purchasing company only deals with a single vendor, this approach 
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potentially can limit the company’s exposure to the best-of-breed capabilities (Levina & 
Su, 2008).   
Comprehensive outsourcing is the classic outsourcing model that predominated 
throughout the 1980s and most of 1990s (Lacity et al., 1996).  Lacity et al. (1996) defines 
comprehensive outsourcing as a practice that involves transfers from internal IT functions 
to third-party vendors of IT assets, leases, staff, and management responsibility for 
delivery of IT services, which account for at least 80% of the IT budget.  A small 
minority of companies adopt this IT outsourcing approach and form close partnerships 
with their IT vendors. Some examples of these types of partnership including the Inland 
Revenue and Electronic Data Systems (EDS) (Kern, Willcocks, & Van Heck, 2002), the 
London Stock Exchange and Anderson Consulting (Clark, 2000), as well as British 
Aerospace and CSC (Willcocks & Lacity, 1999).   
Comprehensive outsourcing contracts often involve complex technical disciplines 
such as the case in which the contracted service provider will act as a prime contractor 
and tap into multiple providers for delivering the outsourced services (Capgemini, 2006).  
While this practice of sub-contracting will help organizations gain best-of-breed 
experience, it increases the risk that the prime contractor will fail to act effectively as the 
project manager or liaison between service recipient and subcontractors.   
Another variation of the service provider composition is that a company will 
contract out its IT functions to a number of service providers, also known as multi-
sourcing (Cohen & Young, 2006; Levina & Su, 2008). Either the customer or one of 
these service providers will have the overall project management responsibility 
throughout the outsourcing period.  
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In either of these arrangements—either simple or multi-sourcing—security issues, 
liabilities, and possible higher transaction costs are considerations (Cohen & Young, 
2006; Trent & Monczka, 2003). For example, General Motors Corporation (GM) 
renewed two long-term contracts with Capgemini in June 2010. The combined 5-year 
agreements were valued at approximately US$250 million, which replaced two of the six 
previously signed 5-year mega-size multi-sourcing contracts that took effect in June 2006 
(Capgemini, July 28, 2010). Three additional 5-year contracts valued at US$100 million 
were later signed on December of the same year to extend three other existing contracts. 
Previously in 2006, as part of a continuous outsourcing effort, GM awarded six vendors 
approximately $7.5 billion worth of IT work over a five-year period.  Among these six 
vendors, Capgemini was charged to manage application development and integration 
across the automaker’s business units and, on an enterprise-wide basis, to ensure that all 
the work follows GM’s standard (Capgemini, 2006). Under this arrangement, Gapgemini 
also was charged to manage other vendors who were selected to do some of the 
application development projects (Schaffhauser, 2007). This included monitoring other 
service providers to ensure they adhere to GM standard, which range from common 
technology standards to processes for system verification, validation and project 
management (Mitchell, 2006). During an interview, Ralph Szygenda, who was the chief 
information officer and group vice president of GM, told a reporter that GM outsourced 
most of its IT operations, but had maintained 2,000 employees to handle "strategic 
management of information technology” (Mitchell, 2006, p. 1). He believed making 
suppliers adhere to a similar set of standards created a win-win for all parties involved. 
Szygenda explained "You take all of the mundane IT processes that really aren't 
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innovation for GM or the IT company and make all that simple," (Mitchell, 2006). 
Furthermore, Szgenda said implementing a single set of operating standards would allow 
GM to improve global collaboration, while assuring reliability of its computing systems 
and cutting costs. "It lets GM focus on innovation rather than spending a lot of time on 
managing its suppliers." he said at a press conference (Hamm, 2006). In addition, it was 
reported that the significant cost savings through its multi-sourcing arrangement allowed 
GM to reduce its annual IT budget from US$4 billion in 2000 to approximately US$2 
billion in 2010 (Reid, 2009).      
In a comprehensive outsourcing environment, service providers are responsible 
for all aspects of the IT infrastructure that they are charged to handle, including server 
center, network, security, system administration, application development, and 
maintenance (Lacity et al., 1996).  This approach works better for medium- to large-sized 
corporations because they can command service providers’ attention when service-related 
issues surface (Mitchell, 2006).  However, smaller organizations probably do not have 
the same purchasing power to demand a similar amount of responsiveness from their 
vendors, especially when dealing with large service providers. Under this arrangement, 
the selected service provider usually controls the IT operation that was once controlled by 
the customer (Lacity et al., 1996). Depending on the nature of the outsourced operation, 
the staff of the services provider may work on the same premises as the employees of the 
clients (Lacity et al., 1996) or they may work off-site or offshore while performing their 
functions (Herath & Kishore, 2009). A few multi-national corporations, such as General 
Electric (Mamgain & Mishra, 2010) and IBM Corp., (Northrup, 2003) have been 
outsourcing services globally for decades. As reported by Mamgain and Mishra (2010), 
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one of GE’s outsourcing initiatives was started by Jack Welch who established an 
outsourcing alliance in India for GE’s healthcare business approximately two decades 
ago. In its 2002 Annual Report, GE announced its intention of outsourcing $5 billion in 
contracts to Chinese vendors by 2005 (GE, 2004). Sending work to offshore locations 
became common practice in the late 1990s, when there were shortages in IT skills in both 
Europe and North America, particularly those required for fixing Y2K and Euro 
conversion programs (Morrison & Macia, 2005). Lewin and Peeters (2006) defined 
offshoring as a company practice that relocates a business-related activity to a wholly 
owned company or independent service provider in another country, which often incurs 
lower costs for the outsourcer. Jain, Kundu, and Niederman (2008) believed that 
offshoring can be established through different channels, including: 
1.  Creating a subsidiary abroad and transferring work to that new internal 
organizational unit,  
2. Acquiring a subsidiary in another country,  
3. Hiring individual workers in another country directly,  
4. Hiring an external service provider that operates in a foreign country, or  
5. Contracting with a multi-national service provider with the intention of using their 
labor forces abroad (Jain, Kundu, & Niederman, 2008). Among these five distinct 
channels of offshoring that Jain et al. mentioned, this dissertation is concerned with 
only the last two channels as they are describing services that actually are being 
outsourced to external service providers. These two means of relocating production of 
goods and services to facilities in other countries have also been called offsourcing 
(Lovvorn, Kedia, & Lahiri, 2004). One example of this arrangement is the five-year 
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IT management services outsourcing agreement that Atos Origin has with the Belgian 
mobile telecommunications providers BASE, which is the wholly owned subsidiary 
of KPN (Atos Origin, 2007).   
As part of the outsourcing process, approximately 40 BASE employees were 
transferred to Atos Origin. Under this agreement, Atos Origin was responsible for the IT 
infrastructure, including data center, service desk, security management, and storage.  In 
the application management area, BASE transferred all applications management 
services, including corrective maintenance and third-party management to its service 
provider (Atos Origin, 2007). While BASE continued to influence the strategic 
orientation of its IT activities, Atos Origin took care of all operational support for BASE.  
Because of the documented benefits, such as lower cost of skilled workers (Sattineni, 
2007), increased shareholders’ value (Hanna & Daim, 2009), greater focus on core 
competencies (Kakumanu & Portanova, 2006), improved process efficiencies and quality, 
and the ability to scale operation up and down as needed (Claire, Gupta, & Tarsh, 2010), 
many of the fully outsourced contracts ended up operating in locations outside of the 
customers’ home location (Hanna & Daim, 2009). This practice, offshore outsourcing, 
continues to gain popularity (Kakumanu & Portanova, 2006). As Sattineni (2007) stated, 
“back office work such as human resources, accounting, auditing, advertising, 
telemarketing and customer relations” (p.1) were among candidates that US corporations 
outsourced to vendors in foreign countries.    
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APPENDIX B 
 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
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Demographics 
1) Management Level:  
        Manager ________ 
        Director _______ 
        EVP / Vice President _____   
        CIO ________ 
        CTO _________ 
        COO ________ 
        CEO _____   
        Others ___________________ 
4) Education:    
        Less than High School _____  
        High School / GED _____    
        Some College _____  
        2-year College Degree _____ 
        4-year College Degree _____    
        Masters Degree _____    
        Doctorate Degree _____ 
        Professional Degree (JD, MD) ______ 
 
2) Age:  
 Under 15 _____   
         15-24 _____   
 25-34 _____   
         35-44 _____  
         45-54 _____  
         55-64 _____   
         65 and older _____ 
5) Years at Current Position:  
         Less than 2 _____   
         2 to 5 _____  
         6 to 10 _____ 
         11 to 15 _____   
         16 to 20 _____    
      More than 20 _____ 
 
3) Gender:   Male _____   Female _____ 
 
 
Control Variables 
 
Question: Which of the following categories does your business fall under? 
1. Banking and Finance 2. Manufacturing  3. Information and telecommunication 
4. Retail and Wholesale  5. Construction  6. Services 
7. Public Administration 8. Agriculture, Forestry, and fishing 9. Others  
 
Question: Please provide approximate details about your organization and yourself:  
Total amount of sales volume (as of the previous financial year): (            ) 
Year when IT outsourcing was first adopted: (            ) 
Year of the IT outsourcing project that you last managed: (           ) 
On average, the IT outsourcing project that you have managed takes: (            ) months 
 
The following questions were based on a seven-point Likert scale that range from 
a value of 1 to 7, as follows: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
Financial commitment in the form of dedicated asset-specific investments 
1)  You and your vendors have invested in related facility to better serve the needs of both parties.   
2)  You and your vendors have reengineered relevant business processes to fit the specific requirements 
  of both parties.   
3)  You and your vendors have had trained employee assigned to handle that particular relationship only.   
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Future business partnership 
1)    The parties expect to work together on future projects. 
2)    The parties were expected to focus on long-term goals in the relationship. 
3)    Our involvement with this contractor is open ended. 
4)    We expect this contractor to grow into a lifelong partner. 
 
Calculative trust 
1) We cannot leave this service provider because of the amount of money, time, and energy we 
have invested in the relationship. 
2) Transferring existing IT project to a different vendor would cause my company significant 
problems. 
3) We maintain our relationship with our vendors because leaving them would mean 
significant sacrifices. 
Attitudinal commitment  
1) We and our vendor do our best to maintain the relationship. 
2) The relationship between us and our vendor is strengthened. 
3) We and our vendor always try to keep each other’s promises. 
4) We and our vendor are willing to continue the relationship. 
 
Overall managerial perception of IT outsourcing   
1) How well your contractors have delivered what they have promised in terms of meeting deadlines 
specified in the Service Level Agreement.  
2) How well your contractors have delivered what they have promised in terms of providing key activities 
such as applications development, software maintenance or infrastructure support, specified in the 
Service Level Agreement.  
3) How well your contractors have delivered what they have promised in terms of meeting the overall 
Service Level Agreement.  
 
Technological capability 
1) Our IT team has developed a scheme for IT standardization. 
2) Our IT team has the ability to integrate IT. 
3) Our IT team understands the trend of IT. 
 
Outsourcing Success 
1) We have been able to refocus on core business.  
2) We have enhanced our IT competence. 
3) We have increased access to skilled personnel. 
4) We have enhanced economies of scale in human resources. 
5) We have enhanced economies of scale in technological resources. 
6) We have increased control of IT expenses. 
7) We have reduced the risk of technological obsolescence. 
8) We have increased access to key information technologies. 
9) We are satisfied with our overall benefits from outsourcing. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Reliability and validity information from the questionnaire sources 
 
 
Question Source Construct 
reliability 
Item reliability Convergent validity Discriminant validity 
Asset-specific 
investments  
• You and this service 
provider have invested in a 
related facility to better 
serve the needs of both 
parties. 
• You and this service 
provider have 
reengineered relevant 
business processes to fit 
the specific requirements 
of both parties. 
• You and this service 
provider have trained 
employee assigned to 
handle that particular 
relationship only. 
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  Item reliability was 
conducted by means of 
factor loadings of the 
construct items. 
Factor loading is 
significant at 0.01 
significance level. The 
factor loading for these 
questions was in the 
range of 0.832 and 
0.841. 
By running a confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) with the 
measurement model, fit indexes 
suggested an acceptable, 
reasonable fit of the model to the 
data (normed fit index [NFI] = 
0.985; non-normed fit index [NNFI] 
= 0.982; comparative fit index [CFI] 
= 0.991; root mean square error of 
approximation [RMSEA] = 0.064). 
Inter-correlations between the constructs were 
not very high. By examining the 95 percent 
confidence intervals around all possible pair-wise 
construct correlations, the construct correlations 
range considerably in value from 0.111 to 0.565 
suggesting discriminant validity among the 
constructs. 
Future Business 
relationship  
• The parties expect to work 
together on future projects. 
• The parties were expected 
to focus on long-term 
goals in the relationship. 
• Our involvement with this 
service provider is open 
ended. 
• We expect to grow into a 
long term relationship with 
this service provider. 
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  RMSEA = 0.03. By examining the difference in chi-square values 
between constrained and unconstrained models, 
test statistics for each pair were all highly 
significant (p  < 0.01), suggesting discriminant 
validity. 
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Question Source Construct 
reliability 
Item reliability Convergent validity Discriminant validity 
Calculative trust 
• We cannot leave this 
service provider because 
of the amount of money, 
time, and energy we have 
invested in the 
relationship. 
• Transferring existing IT 
project to a different 
service provider would 
cause my company a lot of 
trouble, worry and 
problems. 
• We maintain our 
relationship with this 
service provider because 
leaving this service 
provider would mean 
significant sacrifices. 
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  Average Variance Extracted (AVE) 
is greater than 0.50. 
Root AVE = 0.72. 
Attitudinal commitment 
• We and this service 
provider do our best to 
maintain the relationship. 
• The relationship between 
us and this service 
provider is strengthened. 
• We and this service 
provider always try to keep 
each other’s promises. 
• We and this service 
provider are willing to 
continue the relationship. 
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  AVE = 0.669 Root AVE = 0.82 
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Question Source Construct 
reliability 
Item reliability Convergent validity Discriminant validity 
Managers’ experience in 
outsourcing 
• How well your 
contractors have 
delivered what they have 
promised in terms of 
meeting deadlines 
specified in the Service 
Level Agreement. 
• how well your 
contractors have 
delivered what they have 
promised in terms of 
providing key activities 
such as applications 
development, software 
maintenance or 
infrastructure support, 
specified in the Service 
Level Agreement. 
• how well your 
contractors have 
delivered what they have 
promised in terms of 
meeting the overall 
Service Level 
Agreement. 
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 Item loading was 
significant at the 0.05 
level. 
AVE = 0.833, which was larger 
than the cross-correlations with 
other constructs. 
 
Technical capabilities 
• Our IT team has 
developed a scheme for 
IT standardization. 
• Our IT team has ability 
to integrate IT. 
• Our IT team 
understands the trend of 
IT. 
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  AVE = 0.570 Root AVE = 0.75 
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Question Source Construct 
reliability 
Item reliability Convergent validity Discriminant validity 
Manager perception of 
Outsourcing success  
• We have been able to 
refocus on core business. 
• We have enhanced our IT 
competence. 
• We have increased access 
to skilled personnel. 
• We have enhanced 
economies of scale in 
human resources. 
• We have enhanced 
economies of scale in 
technological resources. 
• We have increased control 
of IS expenses. 
• We have reduced the risk 
of technological 
obsolescence. 
• We have increased access 
to key information 
technologies. 
• We are satisfied with our 
overall benefits from 
outsourcing. 
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  Convergent validity was evaluated 
by measuring the correlation of 
each item representing the 
construct with the aggregate 
measure for that construct less the 
focal item.  With the correlation 
ranging between 0.589 and 0.817, 
convergent validity was confirmed.  
Factor analysis was used to confirm discriminant 
validity when items were load onto single factors 
with loadings of greater than 0.50. 
 
 
